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Abstract
We consider an agent who represents uncertainty about the environment via a possibly
misspecified model. Each period, the agent takes an action, observes a consequence,
and uses Bayes’ rule to update her belief about the environment. This framework has
become increasingly popular in economics to study behavior driven by incorrect or biased
beliefs. Current literature has characterized asymptotic behavior under fairly specific
assumptions. By first showing that the key element to predict the agent’s behavior is
the frequency of her past actions, we are able to characterize asymptotic behavior in
general settings in terms of the solutions of a generalization of a differential equation
that describes the evolution of the frequency of actions. We then present a series of
implications that can be readily applied to economic applications, thus providing off-the-
shelf tools that can be used to characterize behavior under misspecified learning.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, evidence of systematic mistakes and biases in beliefs has been col-
lected in a large range of economic environments. Moreover, the evidence indicates that many
of these mistakes persist with experience.1 One approach to incorporating these findings in our
theories is to simply postulate that economic agents have fixed, wrong beliefs about aspects of
their environment, and never learn about these aspects. A different approach that has gained
popularity over the last few years is to postulate that agents do learn about their environment,
but they do so in the context of a misspecified model that misses some important aspects of
reality. The idea is that the world is complex and it is natural for economic agents to represent
uncertainty about the world with parsimonious models that are likely to be misspecified. The
researcher who follows this approach is forced to specify the agent’s misspecification, and the
direction of biases is often not ex-ante obvious without further analysis.
Examples of misspecified learning in economics date back to the 1970s and include the
following: A firm estimates a demand model but wrongly excludes competitors’ prices (Arrow
and Green (1973), Kirman (1975)); a teacher assesses how praise and criticism affect student
performance, but does not understand regression to the mean (Tversky and Kahneman (1973),
Esponda and Pouzo (2016)); a person faces an increasing marginal income tax rate but behaves
as if facing a constant marginal tax (Sobel (1984), Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004), Esponda
and Pouzo (2016)); when learning the value of assets, policies, or investment projects, traders,
voters, and investors fail to account for sample selection (Esponda (2008), Esponda and Pouzo
(2017, 2019a), Jehiel (2018)); a seller estimates a constant-elasticity demand function, but
elasticity is not constant (Nyarko (1991), Fudenberg, Romanyuk and Strack (2017)); a person
inverts causal relationships and incorrectly believes that diet affects a chemical in the blood
which in turn affects health (Spiegler (2016)); overconfidence biases an agent’s learning of a
fundamental (Heidhues, Ko˝szegi and Strack (2018a)).
In all of these examples, the agent processes information through the lens of a simple
model that misses some aspect of reality. The main question in the literature is what happens
to the agent’s behavior as time goes by and she uses feedback to update her belief about
the model’s primitives. The direction of the bias is often not obvious because the agent’s
behavior affects the feedback she observes, this feedback is in turn processed via the agent’s
misspecified model, and this processing leads to updated beliefs and subsequent changes in
behavior, which in turn lead to changes in beliefs, and so on.
1For discussions of the evidence, see, for example, Camerer and Johnson (1997) and Section 3.D in Rabin
(1998).
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Despite these examples, we have not yet fully understood how model misspecification
affects the long-run learning outcome. Indeed, most of the existing papers consider some-
what specialized setups, and we do not know whether the learning process converges beyond
these particular cases. This paper develops a unified theory on Bayesian learning with model
misspecification, which hopefully shapes our understanding of why different models in the
literature lead to different conclusions and allows us to characterize behavior in a much wider
range of settings.
We consider the following environment, which includes many situations of interest, in-
cluding the examples described above. Time is discrete and there is a single, infinitely-lived
agent who discounts the future and must take an action in each period. The agent’s action po-
tentially affects the distribution of an observable variable, which we call a consequence. Her
per-period payoff depends on the agent’s action and the realized consequence. The true distri-
bution over consequences as a function of an action x ∈ X is given by Q(· | x)∈ ∆(Y ), where Y
is the set of consequences. The agent, however, does not know Q. She has a parametric model
of it, given by (Qθ (· | x))x∈X , where parameter values, such as θ , belong to a parameter space
Θ. The agent is Bayesian, so she has a prior over Θ and updates her prior in each period after
observing the realized consequence. The agent’s model is misspecified if the support of her
prior does not include the true distribution Q, and it is correctly specified otherwise.2
Our key point of departure from previous literature is that we begin by focusing on the
evolution of the frequency of actions rather than on actions alone or on the agent’s belief. The
frequency of actions at time t +1 can be written recursively as a function of the frequency at
time t plus some innovation term that depends on the agent’s action at time t +1. The action
at time t +1, however, depends on the agent’s belief at time t, and one challenge is to be able
to write this belief as a function of frequencies of actions so as to make this recursion depend
exclusively on frequencies, not beliefs.
Extending results by Berk (1966) and Esponda and Pouzo (2016), we show that eventu-
ally the posterior at time t roughly concentrates on the set of parameter values that minimize
Kullback-Leibler divergence given the frequency of actions up to time t. This result allows us
to write the evolution of frequencies of actions recursively as a function of the past frequency
alone, excluding the belief. We then apply techniques from stochastic approximation devel-
oped by Benaïm, Hofbauer and Sorin (2005) to show that the continuous-time approximation
of the frequency of actions can be essentially characterized as a solution to a generalization
2The correctly-specified version of this environment was originally studied by Easley and Kiefer (1988) and
Aghion, Bolton, Harris and Jullien (1991).
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of a differential equation.3 Finally, we present a series of implications that can be readily
applied to economic applications, thus providing off-the-shelf tools that can be valuable to
people working in this area. In fact, for the special case of one-dimensional models–a case
that includes most of the applications in the literature–our results imply that one can essentially
characterize convergence and stability by looking at a simple two-dimensional figure.
Our results pertain to the agent’s long-run behavior, and there are at least three reasons why
the focus on long-run behavior is important. First, there are many instances where it is not
surprising that people initially make incorrect decisions and the more interesting question is
what types of biases persist with experience. Second, systematic patterns tend to arise as time
goes by, while initial behavior tends to be more dependent on random draws. Finally, there
is a long tradition in statistic and economics focusing on asymptotic or equilibrium behavior,
and so we can use existing tools as well as compare our results to existing results in these
literatures.
Our work benefits from previous work on misspecified learning. Our environment is the
single-agent version of the environment studied by Esponda and Pouzo (2016). They introduce
the notion of a Berk-Nash equilibrium and show that, under some conditions, if behavior con-
verges then it must converge to a Berk-Nash equilibrium.4 But they do not study convergence
in general.5
Papers that study convergence in misspecified settings are few and ingeniously establish
results, though for somewhat specialized setups. Nyarko (1991) presents an example where the
agent’s action does not converge. Fudenberg, Romanyuk and Strack (2017) consider a more
general model where the agent has a finite number of actions but still updates between two
possible models (i.e., Θ has two elements). They provide a full characterization of asymptotic
actions and beliefs, including cases where the action converges and cases where it does not.
Their model is in continuous time and they exploit the fact that the belief overΘ follows a one-
dimensional stochastic differential equation. Heidhues, Ko˝szegi and Strack (2018a) study a
3The type of differential equation is called a differential inclusion in the literature. It differs from a differential
equation in that there may be multiple derivatives at certain points and therefore multiple trajectories that solve the
equation. Multiplicity arises in our environment because there are certain beliefs at which the agent is indifferent
between different actions, and we need to keep track of what would happen to beliefs and subsequent actions if
the agent were to follow any one of these actions.
4There are many examples of boundedly-rational equilibrium concepts that abstract away from the question
of dynamics and convergence, including (Jehiel, 2005, 1995), Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), Eyster and Rabin
(2005), Esponda (2008), Jehiel and Koessler (2008), and (Spiegler, 2016, 2017).
5Esponda and Pouzo (2016) tackle the issue of convergence in Theorem 3, where they use an idea from
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) to show that, if agents are allowed to make possibly large but vanishing mistakes,
then behavior can converge to any equilibrium. Here, as in the rest of the literature on misspecified learning, we
consider the case where agents don’t make these types of mistakes.
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model of an agent whose overconfidence biases his learning of a fundamental that is relevant
for determining the optimal action. They are able to establish convergence by exploiting the
monotone structure of their environment. Heidhues, Koszegi and Strack (2018b) consider
an environment where action spaces are continuous, the state has a unidirectional effect on
output, and the prior and noise are normal. These assumptions imply that the posterior admits
a one-dimensional summary statistic, to which they apply tools from stochastic approximation
theory to establish convergence.6 As mentioned above, we are able to make significantly more
progress by focusing on the frequency of actions, as opposed to the action itself or the belief.7
Tools from stochastic approximation have been previously applied in economics, includ-
ing the literature on learning in games (e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), Benaim and Hirsch
(1999), and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)) and learning in macroeconomics (e.g., Sargent
(1993)). Our approach is inspired by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993)’s model of stochastic fic-
titious play. In that environment, the frequency of past actions exactly represents the agents’
beliefs about other agents’ strategies. In our environment, we characterize beliefs to be a
function of the frequency of actions.
Misspecified learning has also been studied in other environments. Rabin and Vayanos
(2010) study a case where shocks are i.i.d. but agents believe them to be autoregressive.
Esponda and Pouzo (2019b) extend Berk-Nash equilibrium to Markov decision problems,
where a state variable, other than a belief, affects continuation values. He (2018) considers
agents suffering from the gambler’s fallacy who mislearn from endogenously censored data.
Molavi (2018) studies a general-equilibrium framework that nests a class of macroeconomic
models where agents learn with misspecified models. Bohren and Hauser (2018) and Frick,
Iijima and Ishii (2019a) characterize asymptotic behavior in social learning environments with
model misspecification.8 Finally, Frick, Iijima and Ishii (2019b) focus on convergence and ro-
bustness of the stability of equilibrium in both single-agent and social learning environments.
We do not study robustness but study asymptotic properties of the learning process in a more
general way. In particular, we develop general tools to study whether behavior converges or
not, and what happens if it does not converge. We believe our results can be extended to these
other environments.
6For another example using normality assumptions and stochastic approximation, see the online appendix of
Esponda and Pouzo (2016).
7Incidentally, we show that in some of the examples of Nyarko (1991) and Fudenberg, Romanyuk and Strack
(2017) where the action diverges, the action frequency converges. This is the first result of its kind and it provides
a new interpretation of a mixed-action steady state. We also present examples where not even the action frequency
converges.
8See also Eyster and Rabin (2010), Bohren (2016), and Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin (2017).
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Finally, we take the misspecification as given and establish results for all types of mis-
specifications. For work that could help understand which types of misspecifications are more
likely to arise, see, e.g., Aragones et al. (2005), Al-Najjar (2009), Al-Najjar and Pai (2013),
Schwartzstein (2014), and Olea et al. (2019).
We present the model in Section 2, characterize asymptotic beliefs in Section 3 and asymp-
totic behavior in Section 4, and then present implications relevant to economic applications in
Section 5. We relate our findings to the notion of a Berk-Nash equilibrium in Section 6.
2 The environment
Objective environment. There is a single agent facing the following infinitely repeated prob-
lem. Each period t = 1,2, ..., the agent must choose an action from a finite set X . She then
receives a consequence according to the consequence function Q : X → ∆Y , where Y is the
set of consequences and ∆Y is the set of all (Borel) probability measures over it. Finally, the
payoff function pi : X ×Y → R determines the agent’s current payoff. In particular, if xt ∈ X
is the agent’s choice at time t, then yt ∈ Y is drawn according to the probability measure
Q(· | xt) ∈ ∆Y , and the agent’s payoff at time t is pi(xt ,yt).
Assumption 1. (i) Y is a compact subset of Euclidean space; (ii) There exists a Borel proba-
bility measure ν ∈ ∆Y such that, for all x∈ X, Q(·|x) ν , i.e., Q(·|x) is absolutely continuous
with respect to ν (an implication is the existence of densities q(· | x) ∈ L1(Y,R,ν) such that´
A q(y | x)ν(dy) =Q(A|x) for any A⊆Y Borel); (iii) For all x∈ X, pi(x, ·)∈ L1(Y,R,Q(· | x)).9
Assumption 1 collects some standard technical conditions. It includes both the case where
the consequence is a continuous variable ( ν is the Lebesgue measure and q(· | x) is the density
function) and the case where it is discrete ( ν is the counting measure and q(· | x) is the
probability mass function).
In the special case in which the agent knows the primitives and wishes to maximize dis-
counted expected utility, she chooses an action in each period from the set of actions that
maximizes ˆ
Y
pi(x,y)Q(dy | x) =
ˆ
Y
pi(x,y)q(y|x)ν(dy).
We will study the case where the agent does not know the consequence function Q.
9As usual, Lp(Y,R,ν) denotes the space of all functions f : Y → R such that ´ | f (y)|p ν(dy)< ∞.
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Subjective family of models. The agent is endowed with a parametric family of conse-
quence functions, QΘ = {Qθ : θ ∈ Θ}, where each Qθ : X → ∆Y is indexed by a model
θ ∈Θ. We refer toQΘ as the family of models and say that it is correctly specified if Q ∈QΘ
and misspecified otherwise.
Assumption 2. (i) For all θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ X, Qθ (·|x) ν , where ν is defined in A1 (an
implication is the existence of densities qθ (· | x) ∈ L1(Y,R,ν) such that
´
A qθ (y | x)ν(dy) =
Qθ (A|x) for any A ⊆ Y Borel); (ii) Θ is a compact subset of an Euclidean space and, for
all x ∈ X , θ 7→ qθ (· | x) is continuous Q(· | x)-a.s.; ; (iii) For all x ∈ X, there exists gx ∈
L2(Y,R,Q(· | x)) such that, for all θ ∈Θ, |ln(q(· | x)/qθ (· | x))| ≤ gx(·) a.s.-Q(· | x).
Assumption 2(i) guarantees the existence of a density function, and 2(ii) is a standard
parametric assumption on the subjective model. Assumption 2(iii) will be used to establish a
uniform law of large numbers. This condition also implies that, for all θ and x, the support of
Qθ (· | x) contains the support of Q(· | x); in particular, every observation can be generated by
the agent’s model.
Bayesian learning. The agent is Bayesian and starts with a prior µ0 over the space of
modelsΘ. She observes past actions and consequences and uses this information to update her
belief about Θ in every period. The timing is as follows: At each time t, the agent holds some
belief µt . Given µt , she chooses an action xt . Then the consequence yt is drawn according
to Q(· | xt). The agent observes yt , receives an immediate payoff of pi(xt ,yt), and updates
her belief to µt+1 = B(xt ,yt ,µt), where B is the Bayesian operator.10 The next assumption
guarantees that the prior has full support.
Assumption 3. µ0(A)> 0 for any A open and non-empty.
Policy and probability distribution over histories. A policy f is a function f : ∆Θ→ X
specifying the action f (µ) ∈ X that the agent takes at any moment in time in which her belief
is µ .11 A history is a sequence h = (x0,y0, ...,xt ,yt , ...) ∈ H ≡ (X ×Y )∞. Together with the
primitives of the problem, a policy f induces a probability distribution over the set of histories,
which we will denote by P f .
10The Bayesian operator B : X ×Y ×∆Θ→ ∆Θ satisfies, for all A⊆ Θ Borel, for any x ∈ X , and a.s.-Q(· | x),
B(x,y,µ)(A) =
´
A qθ (y | x)µ(dθ)/
´
Θ qθ (y | x)µ(dθ).
11We do not allow the agent to mix to simplify the exposition and to highlight the fact that a mixed distribution
over actions may describe limiting behavior despite the fact that the agent never actually mixes. In the more gen-
eral case where f maps into ∆X , our main result (Theorem 2) holds exactly as stated but some of the statements
in Section 5 need to be modified accordingly.
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Policy correspondence. It will be convenient to characterize behavior for a family of poli-
cies, and not just for a single policy function. For this purpose, we define a policy correspon-
dence to be a mapping F : ∆Θ⇒ X , where F(µ)⊆ X denotes the set of actions that the agent
might choose any time her belief is µ ∈ ∆Θ. We sometimes abuse notation and, for a set of
probability measures A ⊆ ∆Θ, we let F(A) represent the set of actions x such that x ∈ F(µ)
for some µ ∈ A. Let Sel(F) denote the set of all policies f that constitute a selection from the
correspondence F , i.e., with the property that f (µ) ∈ F(µ) for all µ .
Assumption 4. The policy correspondence F is upper hemi-continuous (uhc).
An important special case is one where the agent maximizes discounted expected utility
with discount factor β ∈ [0,1). This problem can be cast recursively as
W (µ) = max
x∈X
ˆ
Y
{
pi(x,y)+βW (µ ′)
}
Q¯µ(dy|x) (1)
where W : ∆Θ→ R is the (unique) solution to the Bellman equation (1), µ ′ = B(x,y,µ) is the
Bayesian posterior, and Q¯µ ≡
´
ΘQθµ(dθ). In this case, it is well known that the correspon-
dence mapping beliefs to optimal actions is uhc.
Action frequency. Our main objective is to study regularities in asymptotic behavior. Pre-
vious work has focused on characterizing the limit of the sequence of actions, whenever it
exists. But there are cases where actions do not converge (e.g., Nyarko (1991)), and in those
cases previous work has not much else to say about asymptotic behavior. We make progress
by studying the action frequency. We do so for two reasons. First, from a practical perspec-
tive, even if actions do not converge, it is possible for the frequency of actions to converge.
Thus, studying frequencies can help uncover additional regularities in behavior, with impor-
tant implications regarding, for example, limiting average payoffs. Second, as we will show,
asymptotic beliefs depend crucially on the action frequency. Because actions in turn depend
on beliefs, future actions depend crucially on the frequency of past actions.
For every t, we define the action frequency at time t to be a function σt :H→ ∆X defined
such that, for all h ∈H and x ∈ X ,
σt(h)(x) =
1
t
t
∑
τ=1
1(x)(xτ(h))
is the fraction of times that action x occurs in history h by time period t.
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3 Asymptotic characterization of beliefs
In this section, we take as given the sequence of action frequencies, (σt)t , and we characterize
the agent’s asymptotic beliefs. In subsequent sections, we will use the characterization of
beliefs to characterize the sequence (σt)t , which is ultimately an endogenous object. The key
object in our characterization is the notion of Kullback-Leibler divergence.12
Definition 1. The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) is a function K : Θ×∆X → R such
that, for any θ ∈Θ and σ ∈ ∆X ,
K(θ ,σ) = ∑
x∈X
EQ(·|x)
[
ln
q(Y | x)
qθ (Y | x)
]
σ(x)
= ∑
x∈X
ˆ
Y
ln
q(y | x)
qθ (y | x)q(y | x)ν(dy)σ(x).
The set of closest models given σ is the set Θ(σ) ≡ argminθ∈ΘK(θ ,σ) and the mini-
mized KLD given σ is K∗(σ)≡minθ∈ΘK(θ ,σ).
Lemma 1. (i) (θ ,σ) 7→ K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ) is continuous; (ii) Θ(·) is uhc, nonempty-, and
compact-valued.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
If the actions were drawn from an i.i.d. distribution σ ∈∆X , we could directly apply Berk’s
(1966) result to conclude that the posterior eventually concentrates on the set of closest models
given σ (i.e., for all open sets U ⊇Θ(σ), limt→∞ µt(U) = 1 P f -a.s.).13 EP2016 showed that
Berk’s conclusion extends even if actions are not i.i.d., provided that the distribution over
actions at time t converges to a distribution σ . This type of result is useful to characterize
behavior under the assumption that it stabilizes, but it is insufficient to determine whether or
not behavior stabilizes.
In the current section, we provide a characterization of beliefs that does not rely on the
assumption that behavior stabilizes. Roughly speaking, we will show that the distance between
the agent’s belief at time t, µt , and the set of probability measures with support in Θ(σt) goes
12Formally, what we call KLD is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions q ·σ and qθ ·σ
defined over the space X×Y .
13See also Bunke and Milhaud (1998). Relatedly, White (1982) shows that the Kullback-Leibler divergence
characterizes the limiting behavior of the maximum quasi-likelihood estimator.
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to zero as time goes to infinity, irrespective of whether or not (σt)t converges. We will establish
this result in several steps, which we now discuss informally and then address formally in the
proofs. First, we note that for any Borel set A ⊆ Θ, the posterior belief over A can be written
as
µt+1(A) =
´
A∏
t
τ=1 qθ (yτ | xτ)µ0(dθ)´
Θ∏
t
τ=1 qθ (yτ | xτ)µ0(dθ)
=
´
A e
−tLt(θ)µ0(dθ)´
Θ e
−tLt(θ)µ0(dθ)
, (2)
where Lt(θ) ≡ t−1∑tτ=1 ln q(yτ |xτ )qθ (yτ |xτ ) is the sample average of the log-likelihood ratios, and
where we have omitted the history for simplicity. Naturally, we might expect the sample
average to converge to its expectation for each θ . The next result strengthens this intuition
and establishes that the difference between Lt(·) and K(·,σt) converges uniformly to zero as
t→ ∞.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-2, for any policy f , limt→∞ supθ∈Θ |Lt(θ)−K(θ ,σt)| = 0
P f -a.s.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The next step is to replace Lt(·) in (2) with K(·,σt). By Lemma 2, for sufficiently large t,
we obtain
µt+1(A)≈
´
A e
−tK(θ ,σt)µ0(dθ)´
Θ e
−tK(θ ,σt)µ0(dθ)
. (3)
As t→∞, the posterior concentrates on models where K(θ ,σt) is close to its minimized value,
K∗(σt). This statement is seen most easily for the case where Θ has only two elements, θ1 and
θ2. In this case, (3) becomes
µt+1(θ1)≈ 1/(1+ µ0(θ2)e
−tK(θ2,σt)
µ0(θ1)e−tK(θ1,σt)
). (4)
Suppose, for example, that (σt)t converges to σ and that KLD is minimized at θ1 given σ .
Then there exists ε > 0 such that, for all sufficiently large t, K(θ2,σt)−K(θ1,σt) > ε . It
follows from (4) that µt+1(θ1) converges to 1, so the posterior concentrates on the model that
minimizes KLD given σ . When (σt)t does not converge, however, we have to account for the
possibility that K(θ2,σt)−K(θ1,σt) > 0 for all t but K(θ2,σt)−K(θ1,σt)→ 0 as t → 0. In
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this case, we cannot say that the posterior eventually puts probability 1 on θ1, even though
θ1 always minimizes KLD. This is why the next result says that the posterior concentrates on
models where K(θ ,σt) is close to its minimized value, K∗(σt), as opposed to saying that the
posterior asymptotically concentrates on the minimizers of KLD given σt .14 We now state the
result formally and provide a proof.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, for any policy f ,
lim
t→∞
ˆ
Θ
(K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt))µt+1(dθ) = 0 P f -a.s. (5)
Proof. Fix a history h such that the condition of uniform convergence in Lemma 2 holds, and
note that the set of histories with this property has probability one (henceforth, we omit the
history from the notation). In particular, for all η > 0, there exists tη such that, for all t ≥ tη ,
|Lt(θ)−K(θ ,σt)|< η (6)
for all θ ∈Θ.
Let K¯(θ ,σ) ≡ K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ). Fix any ε > 0. Using (2) and the facts that 0 ≤ K∗(σ)
(the proof is standard) and K∗(σ)< ∞ (follows from Assumption 2(iii)) for all σ , we obtain
ˆ
K¯(θ ,σt)µt+1(dθ) =
´
Θ K¯(θ ,σt)e
−tLt(θ)µ0(dθ)´
Θ e
−tLt(θ)µ0(dθ)
=
´
Θ K¯(θ ,σt)e
−t(Lt(θ)−K∗(σt))µ0(dθ)´
Θ e
−t(Lt(θ)−K∗(σt))µ0(dθ)
≤ ε+
´
{θ :K¯(θ ,σt)≥ε} K¯(θ ,σt)e
−t(Lt(θ)−K∗(σt))µ0(dθ)´
{θ :K¯(θ ,σt)≤ε/2} e
−t(Lt(θ)−K∗(σt))µ0(dθ)
=: ε+
Aεt
Bεt
.
The proof concludes by showing that limt→∞Aεt /Bεt = 0.
14Formally, what we are saying is that it is not generally true that limt→∞
´
Θ infθ ′∈Θ(σt ) ‖θ −θ ′‖µt+1(dθ) = 0.
This type of statement is true in Berk’s iid setup and, as the previous discussion suggests, it is also true in our
environment under the additional assumption that (σt)t converges.
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By (6), there exists tη such that, for all t ≥ tη ,
Aεt
Bεt
≤
´
{θ :K¯(θ ,σt)≥ε} K¯(θ ,σt)e
−t(K¯(θ ,σt)−η)µ0(dθ)´
{θ :K¯(θ ,σt)≤ε/2} e
−t(K¯(θ ,σt)+η)µ0(dθ)
= e2tη
´
{θ :K¯(θ ,σt)≥ε} K¯(θ ,σt)e
−tK¯(θ ,σt)µ0(dθ)´
{θ :K¯(θ ,σt)≤ε/2} e
−tK¯(θ ,σt)µ0(dθ)
.
Observe that the function x 7→ xexp{−tx} is decreasing for all x > 1/t. Thus, for any t ≥
max{tη ,1/ε} it follows that K¯(θ ,σt)e−tK¯(θ ,σt) ≤ εe−tε over {θ : K¯(θ ,σt)≥ ε}. Thus for all
t ≥max{tη ,1/ε},
Aεt
Bεt
≤ et2η e
−tε/2
µ0 ({θ : K¯(θ ,σt)≤ ε/2}) . (7)
In Appendix A.3, we show that continuity of K¯ and compactness of ∆X imply that
κε ≡ inf
σ∈∆X
µ0 ({θ : K¯(θ ,σ)≤ ε/2})> 0 (8)
for all ε > 0. Thus, setting η = ε/8 > 0, (7) implies that, for all t ≥max{tη ,1/ε},
Aεt
Bεt
≤ e
−tε/4
κε
,
which goes to zero as t→ ∞.
In Section 4, we use Theorem 1 to approximate the agent’s belief, µt , with the set of prob-
ability measures with support in {θ ∈ Θ : K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt)≤ δt}, where δt → 0. Therefore,
we will be able to study the asymptotic behavior of (σt)t via a stochastic difference equation
that only depends on σt and a vanishing approximation error, and not on µt .
4 Asymptotic characterization of action frequencies
In this section, we propose a method to study the asymptotic behavior of the frequencies of
actions. Among other benefits, one can use the method to determine if behavior converges or
not. The key departure from previous approaches in the literature is to focus on the evolution
of frequencies of actions. Using the characterization of beliefs in Theorem 1, we write this
evolution as a stochastic difference equation expressed exclusively in terms of the frequencies
of actions. We then use tools from stochastic approximation developed by Benaïm, Hofbauer
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and Sorin (2005) (henceforth, BHS2015) to characterize the solutions of this difference equa-
tion in terms of the solution to a generalization of a differential equation.
We first provide a heuristic description of our approach. The sequence of frequencies of
actions, (σt)t , can be written recursively as follows:
σt+1 = σt +
1
t+1
(1(xt+1)−σt) , (9)
where 1(xt+1) = (1x(xt+1))x∈X and 1x(xt+1) is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if
xt+1 = x and 0 otherwise.
By adding and subtracting the conditional expectation of 1(xt+1) (i.e., the probability that
each action is played at time t+1 given the belief at time t+1), we obtain
σt+1 = σt +
1
t+1
(E [1(xt+1) | µt+1]−σt)+ 1t+1
(
1(xt+1)−E [1(xt+1) | µt+1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
)
=0
. (10)
The last term in equation (10) is exactly equal to zero because the agent chooses pure
actions.15 The reason it is hard to characterize (σt)t using (10) is that its evolution depends
on the agent’s belief. If we could somehow write the belief µt+1 as a function of σt , then
we would have a recursion where σt+1 depends only on σt . This is where Theorem 1 from
Section 3 is useful. This theorem will allow us to approximate µt+1 with a set of probability
measures that depends on σt .
The ultimate objective is not really to approximate µt+1 but rather the conditional expec-
tation E [1(xt+1) | µt+1] in equation (10). The conditional expectation, however, is typically
discontinuous in the belief (this is particularly so for a belief under which the agent is in-
different between two actions). Thus, replacing µt+1 with a good approximation does not
necessarily yield a good approximation for the conditional expectation. We tackle this discon-
tinuity issue by replacing the function µ 7→ E [1(xt+1) | µ] with a correspondence that contains
this function and is well behaved.
To see how this approach works, note that E[1(xt+1) | µ]∈ ∆F(µ) for all µ . Therefore, we
15More generally, if the agent were allowed to mix, this last term is a Martingale difference sequence and
essentially adds a noise term to the equation that can be controlled asymptotically in a manner that is standard
in the theory of stochastic approximation. Theorem 2 continues to hold as stated, where now ∆F(µ) is a set of
compound lotteries, i.e., it is the set of all distributions over actions σˆ that are induced by some compound lottery
z chosen from ∆F(µ), that is, σˆ(x) =
´
σ∈F(µ) z(σ)σ(x)dσ for each x.
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can view equation (10) as a particular case of the following stochastic difference inclusion:
σt+1 = σt +
1
t+1
(rt+1−σt) , (11)
where rt+1 ∈ ∆F(µt+1). It is called a difference inclusion because rt+1 can take multiple val-
ues. Importantly, we use Theorem 1 to approximate µt+1 with the set of probability measures
µ satisfying
´
Θ(K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt))µ(dθ) ≤ δt , where δt → 0 is a vanishing approximation
error. In particular, if the error were exactly zero, the set would be equal to ∆Θ(σt). More gen-
erally, the difference equation (11) can be written entirely in terms of (σt)t and approximation
errors.
A key insight from the theory of stochastic approximation is that, in order to characterize
a discrete-time process such as (σt)t , it is convenient to work with its continuous-time inter-
polation. Because of the multiplicity inherent in equation (11), we apply the specific methods
developed by BHS2015, who extend Benaim (1996)’s ordinary-differential equation method
to the case of differential inclusions.16
Set τ0 = 0 and τt = ∑ti=1 1/i for t ≥ 1. The continuous-time interpolation of (σt)t is the
function w : R+→ ∆X defined as
w(τt + s) = σt + s
σt+1−σt
τt+1− τt , s ∈ [0,
1
t+1
). (12)
Figure 1 illustrates this simple interpolation for a specific value of x ∈ X . A convenient prop-
erty of the interpolation is that it preserves the accumulation points of the discrete process.
Equations (11) and (12) can be combined to show that the derivate of w with respect to
(a re-indexing of) time, which we denote by w˙, is approximately given by rt+1−σt . As ar-
gued earlier, rt+1 belongs to a set that depends on σt and an approximation error, and this set
is equal to ∆F(∆Θ(σt)). Thus, the derivate approximately takes values in ∆F(∆Θ(σt))−σt .
The next step is to replace σt in this last expression by its interpolation w(t). This replacement
adds yet another vanishing approximation error, and we therefore obtain, ignoring the approx-
imation error, that w˙(t) ∈ ∆F(∆Θ(w(t)))−w(t). Thus, we can show that the continuous-time
interpolation of (σt)t is well approximated by solutions to the following differential inclusion:
σ˙(t) ∈ ∆F(∆Θ(σ(t)))−σ(t). (13)
16See Borkar (2009) for a textbook treatment of the ordinary-differential equation method in stochastic ap-
proximation.
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Figure 1: Example of a continuous-time interpolation.
To state the result formally, we first define what we mean by a solution to the differential
inclusion. A solution to the differential inclusion (13) with initial point σ ∈ ∆X is a map-
ping σ : R→ ∆X that is absolutely continuous over compact intervals with the properties that
σ(0) = σ and that (13) is satisfied for almost every t. Let STσ denote the set of solutions to
(13) over [0,T ] with initial point σ . The assumption that F is uhc implies that, for every initial
point, there exists a (possibly nonunique) solution to (13); see, e.g., Aubin and Cellina (2012).
We now state the main characterization result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold and let F be an uhc policy correspondence.
For any policy f ∈ Sel(F), the following holds P f -a.s.: For all T > 0,
lim
t→∞ infσ∈STw(t)
sup
0≤s≤T
‖w(t+ s)−σ(s)‖= 0. (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2 says that, for any T > 0, the curve w(t + ·) : [0,T ] → ∆X defined by the
continuous-time interpolation of (σt)t approximates some solution to the differential inclu-
sion (13) with initial condition w(t) over the interval [0,T ] with arbitrary accuracy for suffi-
ciently large t. As we will show, this result is convenient because it allows us to characterize
asymptotic properties of (σt)t by solving the differential inclusion in (13).
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BHS2005 refer to a function w satisfying (14) as an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the dif-
ferential inclusion. They show that the limit set of a (bounded) asymptotic pseudotrajectory is
internally chain transitive.17 Thus, one corollary of Theorem 2 is that the frequency of actions
converges almost surely to an internally chain transitive set of the differential inclusion. Be-
cause the notion of internally chain transitive is fairly complex, in the next section we provide
a series of results that help characterize behavior in most common economic applications.
5 Convergence results
We now present a series of implications of Theorem 2 that can be readily applied to economic
applications. Throughout this section we assume that the agent chooses a policy f that is a
selection from F and that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied. All probabilistic statements are with
respect to the corresponding probability measure P f .
5.1 Equilibrium
We begin by defining the notion of equilibrium as a stationary point of the differential inclu-
sion.
Definition 2. σ ∈ ∆X is an equilibrium given a policy correspondence F if σ ∈ ∆F(∆Θ(σ)).
If σ is an equilibrium, then there is a solution of the differential inclusion that starts at σ
and forever remains at σ . The next result shows that, if the action frequency converges, then
it must converge to an equilibrium. In Section 6, we relate this result to previous results in the
literature and show that the notion of equilibrium that arises naturally from our approach is
more general than notions previously considered.
Proposition 1. The following property holds almost surely: If σt converges to some point σ∗,
then σ∗ must be an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
17For a definition of an internally chain transitive set, see BHS2005, Section 3.3, Definition VI.
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5.2 Attracting sets and repelling equilibrium
Proposition 1 shows that, if the action frequency σt converges, its limit must be an equilibrium
of the differential inclusion. However, this is not a complete characterization of the long-
run behavior of the action frequency, for two reasons. First, the proposition applies only to
the case in which the action frequency converges. It does not tell us what happens when
the action frequency does not converge, and also it is not clear when the action frequency
converges. Second, even when the action frequency converges, if there are multiple equilibria,
the proposition does not tell us which one will arise as a long-run outcome. In this section, we
will introduce two concepts, attracting sets and repelling equilibria, which are useful to make
a better prediction about the asymptotic behavior of the action frequency.
Let d(σ ,A) denote the distance from a point σ to a set A, that is, let d(σ ,A)= infσ˜∈A ‖σ − σ˜‖.
The following definition is standard in the stochastic approximation literature (e.g. BHS2015).
Definition 3. A set A ⊆ 4X is attracting if there is a set U such that A ⊂ intU and such
that for any ε > 0, there is T such that d(σ (t),A)< ε for any initial value σ (0) ∈U , for any
solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0) to the differential inclusion, and for any t > T .
In this definition, we require uniform convergence, in that as long as the initial value is
chosen from U , σ (t) is in the ε-neighborhood of A for all periods t > T . Intuitively, this
implies that once σ (t) enters the ε-neighborhood of A, it will never leave this neighborhood.
The largest set U which satisfies the property in this definition is the basin of attraction of
A, and we will denote it by UA. A set A is a globally attracting if it is attracting and its basin
of attraction is the whole space 4X . An equilibrium σ∗ is attracting if the set A = {σ∗} is
attracting.
The following proposition shows that an attracting set appears as a long-run outcome in
some sense. Let E denote the set of all equilibria.
Proposition 2. The following results hold:
(i) If A is globally attracting, then the action frequency σt approaches this set A almost
surely: limt→∞ d(σt ,A) = 0. In particular, if A is a globally attracting equilibrium, σ t
converges to that equilibrium almost surely.
(ii) Suppose that there are finitely many attracting sets (A1, · · · ,AN) such that 4X is the
union of the basins (UA1, · · · ,UAN ) of these attractors and of the equilibrium set E.
Then almost surely, σt approaches the equilibrium set E or one of these attractors:
limt→∞ d(σt ,E) = 0 or limt→∞ d(σt ,An) = 0 for some n.
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Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Recall that in the definition of attracting sets, we require uniform convergence. This prop-
erty is crucial in order to obtain Proposition 2. To see this, let w(t) denote the current action
frequency. Theorem 2 implies that the motion of the action frequency in the future is approx-
imated by a solution σ ∈ S∞w(t) to the differential inclusion for some (long but) finite time T ;
but it does not guarantee that the action frequency w is approximated by σ forever. So even if
all solutions σ ∈ S∞w(t) starting from the current value w(t) converge to some equilibrium σ∗,
the action frequency w may not converge there.18 Formally, Theorem 2 implies that, for any T
and ε > 0, if t is large enough, then ‖w(t+T )−σ (T )‖< ε for some σ ∈ S∞w(t), so the action
frequency w(t+T ) in time t+T is close to the equilibrium σ∗. However, after time t+T , the
action frequency w can be quite different from σ , and it may move away from the equilibrium
σ∗.
This suggests that in order to guarantee convergence to σ∗, we need a stronger assumption,
and uniform convergence is precisely the property we want. To see how it works, note that
Theorem 2 can be applied iteratively, so that the action frequency w from time t+T to t+2T
is approximated by a solution σ ′ ∈ S∞w(t+T ) starting from w(t+T ). As mentioned earlier, this
value w(t + T ) is close to the equilibrium σ∗. So if the equilibrium σ∗ is attracting, then
w(t +T ) is in the basin of σ∗, and the solution σ ′ starting from this point stays around the
equilibrium σ∗. This in turn implies that the action frequency w(t + 2T ) in time t + 2T is
also close to σ∗. A similar argument shows that w(t + nT ) in time t + nT is close to σ∗ for
every n = 1,2, · · · . The proof of Proposition 2 generalizes this idea and shows convergence to
attracting sets.19
Now we apply the result to an example where the action does not converge, but the action
frequency does.
Example 1. The consequence space is Y = {0,1}. There are two actions, x1 and x2, and
the probability that the consequence equals one depends on the action: Q(1 | x1) = 3/4 and
Q(1 | x2) = 1/4. The agent, however, has a misspecified model and believes the consequence
does not depend on the action: Qθ (1 | xk) = θ ∈ Θ = [0,1] for k ∈ {1,2}, i.e., according to
model θ , the probability that the consequence is y= 1 is θ irrespective of the action. The KLD
18This is a so-called “shadowing” problem in the literature on stochastic approximation. See Section 8 of
Benaim (1999) for more details.
19Formally, the whole path of w is approximated by a chain of trajectories (σ 1,σ 2, · · ·) where ‖σ n(T )−
σ n+1(0)|< ε , and uniform convergence ensures that this chain of trajectories converges to σ∗.
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Figure 2: Globally attracting equilibrium
function in this case is
K(σ ,θ) = σ(x1)
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,
and there is a unique minimizer θ(σ) = 34σ(x1)+
1
4σ(x2). Naturally, the model that best fits
the true model is a convex combination of the probability that y = 1 under actions x1 and x2.
The payoff function satisfies pi(x1,y) = 1− y and pi(x2,y) = y; in particular, the agent
prefers action x1 if y = 0 and x2 if y = 1. Letting Eµ [y] ≡
´
θµ(dθ) denote the agent’s per-
ceived expected value of y, the optimal correspondence satisfies F(µ) = {x1} if Eµ [y] < .5,
= {x2} if Eµ [y]< .5, and = {x1,x2} if Eµ [y] = .5.
Actions in this example are negatively reinforcing in the sense that doing more of one
action makes the agent want to do less of that action. This feature can be seen in Figure 2,
where we have plotted σ 7→ ∆F(∆Θ(σ)). For example, if the agent takes pure action x1, i.e.,
σ(x1) = 1, then the closest model is θ(σ) = 34 , so the agent’s belief is degenerate at θ = 3/4,
i.e., µ = δ3/4, and she prefers to take action x2, not x1. Similarly, if the agent takes only action
x2, she prefers to take action x1.
The feature of negatively reinforcing actions is present in several examples in the literature,
and previous work has shown that the action does not converge in those examples (e.g., Nyarko
(1991), Esponda and Pouzo (2016), Fudenberg, Romanyuk and Strack (2017)).20 We can use
20Negative reinforcement is also present in some of the examples in Spiegler (2016) as well as in the vot-
ing environments of Esponda and Pouzo (2017, 2019a) and Esponda and Vespa (2018) and in the investment
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our differential inclusion to go beyond this result and show that the action frequency does
converge. In the example, σ∗(x1) = σ∗(x2) = 1/2 is the unique equilibrium point: Given σ∗,
the closest model is θ(σ∗) = 1/2, and, given the belief δ1/2, the agent is indifferent between
each of the actions in the support of σ∗. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, for any initial condition,
the solutions to the differential inclusion converge to σ∗, and so {σ∗} is a globally attracting
set. Proposition 2(i) implies that the action frequency almost surely converges to σ∗.
In the next example, we show that the attracting set need not be an equilibrium.
Example 2. The consequence space is Y = R3. There are three actions, x1, x2, and x3. Given
an action xk, the consequence y follows the normal distribution N(ek, I) where ek ∈ R3 is the
unit vector whose kth component is one, and I is the identity matrix. However, the agent
does not recognize that the action influences the consequence. Formally, the model space is
the probability simplex Θ = {θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3)|∑3k=1θk = 1, θk ≥ 0 ∀k}, and for each model
θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3), the agent believes that y follows the normal distribution N(θ , I). Assume that
for each degenerate belief δθ , the policy F(δθ ) is given as in Figure 3, where the triangle
represents the model space Θ. For example, if the current belief puts probability one on the
model θ = e1, then the policy F selects the action x2.
e1
(0.9,0,0.1)
e2
e3
(0.1,0.9,0)
(0,0.1,0.9)
x2
x3
x1
1
Figure 3: Policy F(δθ ) for each model θ
x1
x2
x3
2
Figure 4: Differential Inclusion
In this example, given a mixed action σ ∈ 4X, the consequence follows the normal dis-
tribution N(σ , I), so the Kullback-Leibler divergence K(θ ,σ) has a unique minimizer θ = σ .
Accordingly, a solution to the differential inclusion is described as in Figure 4, where the
environment of Jehiel (2018).
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triangle represents the whole action space 4X and each arrow points to the corresponding
vertex in the large triangle.
This example has a unique equilibrium, σ∗ = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). This equilibrium is not attracting.
Indeed, starting from any nearby point σ 6= σ∗, a solution to the differential inclusion moves
away from the equilibrium, as described in Figure 5.
On the other hand, the cycle described by the arrows in Figure 6 is attracting. The basin
of attraction is the whole space4X except the equilibrium point σ∗ = (13 , 13 , 13). That is, given
any initial value σ 6= σ∗, any solution to the differential inclusion will eventually follow this
cycle. (The proof is straightforward and hence omitted. )
x1
x2
x3
3
Figure 5: Instability of the equilibrium
x1
x2
x3
4
Figure 6: Limit cycle.
Proposition 2(ii) implies that in Example 2, the action frequency σt must converge to the
(non-attracting) equilibrium σ = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) or follow the limit cycle described in Figure 6. But
which one is more likely to occur? It turns out that the equilibrium σ∗ in the example above is
unstable, in that the action frequency never converges there. So the action frequency follows
the limit cycle almost surely.
To see why the equilibrium σ∗ is unstable, suppose that the current action frequency is
exactly this equilibrium, i.e., σt = σ∗. Suppose also that the agent chooses some action today,
say x1. This changes the action frequency in the next period, and we have σt+1 = 1t+1δx1 +
t
t+1σ
∗. Note that this new action frequency is slightly different from the equilibrium σ∗. Then
starting from this action frequency, a solution to the differential inclusion moves away from the
equilibrium (See Figure 5), which implies instability of σ∗. More formally, this equilibrium
σ∗ is repelling in the following sense:
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Definition 4. An equilibrium σ∗ is repelling if there is a natural number T and an open neigh-
borhood U of σ∗ such that for any σ ∈U , for any x ∈ F(4Θ(σ∗)), and for any β ∈ (0,1),
there is β ∈ (β ,1) such that for any σ ∈ S∞βσ+(1−β )δx , we have σ (t) /∈U for some t ∈ [0,T ].
In Example 2, starting from any nearby point σ 6= σ∗ of the equilibrium σ∗, the solution to
the differential inclusion moves away from the equilibrium σ∗. In such a case, the condition
stated in the definition is satisfied, so this equilibrium σ∗ is repelling.
But our definition of repelling equilibrium is a bit more general. Roughly, an equilibrium
σ∗ is repelling if starting from almost all nearby points σ 6= σ∗ of the equilibrium σ∗, all the
solutions to the differential inclusion eventually leave its neighborhood. This is illustrated in
the following example:
Example 3. We add one more action x′3 to Example 2. This new action x
′
3 is redundant, and is
identical to the action x3. Formally, the signal distribution given the action x′3 is N(e3, I), and
the policy F(µ) contains x′3 for all µ such that F(µ) contains x3 in Example 2. The agent still
believes that the action does not influence the signal distribution.
This example has a continuum of equilibria; any mixed action σ with σ(x1) = σ(x2) =
σ(x3)+σ(x′3)=
1
3 is an equilibrium. Pick one equilibrium σ
∗, and pick an open neighborhood
U . This neighborhood U contains equilibrium points and non-equilibrium points. The set
of equilibrium points is continuous, but has measure zero; so almost all the points in U are
non-equilibrium points. Starting from these non-equilibrium points, all the solutions to the
differential inclusion leave the neighborhood U , just as described in Figure 5. However,
starting from the equilibrium points, a solution to the differential inclusion can stay there
forever. So U contains some points from which the solution to the differential inclusion does
not leave U . Still, this equilibrium σ∗ is repelling. Indeed, given any point σ ∈U and given
any action x, if we choose β sufficiently close to one, the perturbed point βσ+(1−β )δx is not
an equilibrium; so starting from this perturbed point, the solution to the differential inclusion
eventually leaves U .
The following proposition asserts that repelling equilibria do not arise as long-run out-
comes.
Proposition 3. If σ∗ is a repelling equilibrium, then the action frequency σt converges to σ∗
with probability zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
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5.3 Convergence to attracting sets for some prior
Proposition 2 provides a useful set of conditions under which the action frequency converges
to an attracting set, such as the set of equilibria. Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that the
frequency cannot converge to repelling equilibria. These propositions, however, do not imply
that the action frequency converges to any one specific attracting set or equilibrium (unless it is
globally attracting). We will show that if an attracting set A satisfies some additional property,
then the action frequency converges to it (i.e., limt→∞ d(σt ,A) = 0) with positive probability
for some initial prior.21 Throughout this section, let Bε(A) denote the ε-neighborhood of A,
i.e., it is the set of all σ such that d(σ ,A)< ε .
We first introduce the idea of a “perturbed differential inclusion.” Given an initial value
σ (0), let S∞,εσ (0) denote the set of all solutions to the following differential inclusion:
σ˙ (t) ∈
⋃
σ˜∈Bε (σ (t))
4F(4Θ(σ˜))−σ (t). (15)
Recall that in the original differential inclusion, the agent chooses an action from F(4Θ(σ (t))).
In (15), this choice set is expanded, so that the agent chooses an action from F(4Θ(σ˜)), where
σ˜ is a perturbation of the current action frequency σ (t).
Definition 5. A set A is robustly attracting if it is attracting and there is ζ > 0 and ε > 0 such
that for any initial value σ (0) ∈ Bζ (A), any solution σ ∈ S∞,εσ (0) to the perturbed differential
inclusion never leaves the basin UA; i.e., σ (t) ∈UA for all t ≥ 0.
In some special cases, attracting sets and robustly attracting sets are equivalent. For ex-
ample, as will be explained in Proposition 7, attracting sets are robustly attracting when Θ is
the one-dimensional interval [0,1]. The same result holds when there are only two actions i.e.,
|X |= 2. (The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.) However, in general, attracting sets
need not be attracting. Such an example can be found in Appendix A.8.
A sufficient condition for a set A to be robustly attracting is that the (non-perturbed) dif-
ferential inclusion has a contraction property in a neighborhood of A. Formally, let V (σ) =
d(σ ,A), and suppose that there is an open neighborhood U of A such that (σ˜−σ) ·∇V (σ)< 0
21Theorem 7.3 of Benaim (1999) gives a sufficient condition for convergence to an attracting set for some prior.
This result, however, relies on a technical assumption ((24) in his paper) that does not hold in our environment.
Hence we cannot use his theorem and need to develop a new tool.
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for all σ ∈U \A and σ˜ ∈4F(4Θ(σ)).22 Then this A is robustly attracting.23 Note that this
contraction property is satisfied by any strict equilibrium; a pure action δx is a strict equilib-
rium if there is an open neighborhood U of δx such that F(4Θ(σ˜)) = {x} for all σ˜ ∈U . So
any strict equilibrium is robustly attracting.
We will show that the action frequency converges to a robustly attracting set with positive
probability, at least for some initial prior.
Proposition 4. For each robustly attracting set A, there is an initial prior µ∗0 with full support
such that limt→∞ d(σt ,A) = 0 with positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
5.4 Belief convergence when Θ= [0,1]
In this subsection, we will focus on a special case in which the model space is the one-
dimensional interval Θ = [0,1]. This special case includes most of the current applications
in the literature and it allows us to provide a more powerful characterization of the action fre-
quency and the belief. Specifically, we will first explain that our differential inclusion reduces
to a one-dimensional problem; this reduction considerably simplifies our analysis, because in
general the action frequency σ is multi-dimensional and solving the differential inclusion can
be a difficult task. Then we will show that the belief converges to an equilibrium belief almost
surely, and we will provide a simple characterization of attracting/repelling equilibria.
Throughout this subsection, we will impose the following identifiability assumption:
Assumption 5. The following two conditions hold:
(i) For each σ , there is a unique minimizer of K(σ ,θ) which we denote by θ(σ) ∈ [0,1],
that is, Θ(σ) = {θ(σ)}.
22 More generally, A is robustly attracting if there is an open neighborhood U of A and a function V : U → R+
such that (i) V (σ) = 0 if and only if σ ∈ A, (ii) (σ˜−σ) ·∇V (σ)< 0 for all σ ∈U \A and σ˜ ∈4F(4Θ(σ)), and
(iii) ∇V is Lipchitz-continuous. Note that condition (ii) here is a bit more demanding than Lyapunov stability,
which requires V (σ (t))<V (σ (0)) for all σ (0) and σ ∈ S∞σ (0).
23The proof is as follows. It is obvious that A is attracting, so we will show that the condition stated in the
definition of robustly attracting sets is satisfied. Pick ζ > 0 such that B2ζ (A) is in the set U defined above. Let
C = B2ζ (A) \Bζ (A). Since C is compact, (σˆ −σ) ·∇V (σ) < 0 is bounded away from zero uniformly. Then
Lipchitz-continuity of ∇V ensures that there is ε > 0 such that (σˆ − σ˜) ·∇V (σ˜) < 0 for all σ ∈C, σ˜ ∈ Bε(σ),
and σˆ ∈ F(4Θ(σ)). This implies that any solution to the ε-perturbed differential inclusion (15) also has a
contraction property in the interior of the set C; i.e., if the current action frequency σ˜ is an interior point of C and
d(σ˜ ,C)≥ ε , then at the next instant, the action frequency becomes closer to the set A. This immediately implies
that A is robustly attracting.
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(ii) For each σ with θ(σ) ∈ (0,1), we have ∂ 2K(σ ,θ)∂θ2
∣∣∣
θ=θ(σ)
> 0.
Part (i) is what we call the identifiability condition, which asserts that for each mixed action
σ , there is a unique model which best fits the true world. EP2016 provide a more detailed
discussion about this identifiability condition. Note that the best model θ(σ) is continuous in
σ , because Θ(σ) is upper hemi-continuous in σ ,
Part (ii) requires that whenever θ(σ) is an interior solution (so that the first-order condition
is satisfied at the minimum), it satisfies the second-order condition. This technical assump-
tion is crucial for the strict monotonicity result (Proposition 5(iii)), which is needed to prove
instability of repelling models (Proposition 8). But all other results remain true even if this
assumption (ii) is dropped.
The following proposition shows that the closest model θ(σ) is monotone with respect to
the action σ . In the proof, we first show that the KL divergence K(σ ,θ) has the increasing
differences property. Then the result follows from the monotone selection theorem of Topkis
(1998) and Edlin and Shannon (1998).
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 5 holds. Pick any σ and σ˜ , and for each β ∈ [0,1],
let σβ = βσ +(1−β )σ˜ . Then the following results are true:
(i) If θ(σ) = θ(σ˜), then θ(σβ ) = θ(σ) for all β ∈ [0,1].
(ii) If θ(σ˜)< θ(σ), then θ(σβ ) is weakly increasing with respect to β .
(iii) If θ(σ˜)< θ(σ), then θ(σβ1)< θ(σβ2) for any β1 and β2 such that β1 < β2 and θ(σβ1)∈
(0,1).
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
The monotonicity result above ensures that the motion of the closest model θ(σ) is char-
acterized by a simple, one-dimensional problem. Note that when Θ = [0,1], the best model
θ(σ) can move in only three directions; it can go up, down, or stay the same. In particular,
since the motion of the action frequency is approximated by
σ˙ = σ −σ (t)
for some σ ∈4F(δθ(σ (t))), the monotonicity result in Proposition 5 implies that, at each time
t,
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• θ(σ (t)) moves up if θ(σ)> θ(σ (t)) for all σ ∈4F(δθ(σ (t))).
• θ(σ (t)) moves down if θ(σ)< θ(σ (t)) for all σ ∈4F(δθ(σ (t))).
To better understand the motion of θ(σ (t)), consider the following example:
Example 4. The consequence space is Y =R, and the agent has two actions, x0 and x1. Given
an action xk, the consequence y follows the normal distribution N(k,1). The agent does not
recognize that the action influences the consequence, and she believes that given a model
θ ∈ [0,1], y follows the normal distribution N(θ ,1) regardless of the chosen action. Consider
an upper hemi-continuous policy F which satisfies
F(δθ ) =

{x0} if θ ∈ [0, 13)∪ (23 ,1]
{x1} if θ ∈ (13 , 23)
{x0,x1} if θ ∈ {13 , 23}
.
Given a mixed action σ , the consequence follows the normal distribution N(σ(x1),1),
so the closest model is θ(σ) = σ(x1). Hence the motion of θ(σ (t)) can be described by
the arrows in Figure 7: θ(σ (t)) will move up in the middle region (i.e., θ(σ (t)) ∈ (13 , 23)),
because the agent chooses the action x1 and the corresponding model is θ(δx1) = 1. For
the other region, θ(σ (t)) will move down because the agent chooses the action x0 and the
corresponding model is θ(δx0) = 0.
x0 x1
θ (σ) = 0 13 θ (σ) = 1
x0
2
3
5
Figure 7: Motion of θ(σ (t))
Using the fact that the closest model θ(σ) follows the simple rule above, we will now show
that it converges almost surely. The intuition is as follows. If the model space is Θ = [0,1]
and θ(σ) follows a recursive rule as in Figure 7, it cannot be cyclic. This implies that θ(σ)
cannot oscillate forever and it must converge. A model θ ∗ is an equilibrium model if there
is an equilibrium σ∗ such that θ(σ∗) = θ ∗. In Example 4, there are three equilibrium models,
0, 1/3, and 2/3. Let Θ∗ ⊆ Θ denote the set of all equilibrium models. Then we have the
following result:
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Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumption 5 holds, and that Θ∗ is finite. Then almost surely,
limt→∞θ(σt) exists and limt→∞θ(σt) ∈Θ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.11.
This proposition, together with Theorem 1, implies that the posterior belief µt converges
almost surely, and the limit belief is a degenerate belief on some equilibrium model. When
there are multiple equilibrium models, Proposition 6 does not tell us which one will arise as a
long-run outcome. To address this concern, we define attracting models as follows.
Definition 6. A model θ ∗ ∈ [0,1] is attracting if there is ε > 0 such that
• θ(δx)≥ θ ∗ for any θ ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗) and for any x ∈ F(δθ ).
• θ(δx)≤ θ ∗ for any θ ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε) and for any x ∈ F(δθ ).
Intuitively, a model θ ∗ is attracting if it is locally absorbing, in that θ(σ (t)) moves toward
θ ∗ in its neighborhood. Indeed, the first bullet point in the definition asserts that if θ(σ (t))
is slightly lower than θ ∗ in the current period t, then it will go up, and hence be closer to θ ∗
at the next instant. Similarly, the second bullet point in the definition ensures that if θ(σ (t))
is slightly higher than θ ∗ in the current period t, then it will go down. In Example 4, the
equilibrium models 0 and 2/3 are attracting, while 1/3 is not.
Given an attracting model θ ∗, let A = {σ ∈4F(δθ∗)|θ(σ) = θ ∗} be the set of equilibria
σ in which the agent has a degenerate belief on θ ∗.24 The following proposition shows that
this set A is robustly attracting, which means that these equilibria should arise as a long-run
outcome at least for some initial prior. Also the proposition shows that the converse is true,
i.e., if a set A = {σ ∈ 4F(δθ∗)|θ(σ) = θ ∗} is robustly attracting, then θ ∗ is an attracting
model.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 5, for each θ ∗, the following properties are equivalent:
(a) θ ∗ is attracting.
(b) The set A = {σ ∈4F(δθ∗)|θ(σ) = θ ∗} is attracting.
24Upper hemi-continuity of F ensures that this set A is non-empty, which in turn implies that any attracting
model is an equilibrium model. For the special case in which F(δθ∗) contains only one component, this set A
is a singleton. Similarly, even when F(δθ∗) contains only two components, the set A is a singleton for generic
parameters. On the other hand, when F(δθ∗) contains three or more actions, the set A is typically continuous.
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(c) The set A is robustly attracting.
Proof. See Appendix A.12.
In the same spirit, we define repelling models as follows:
Definition 7. A model θ ∗ ∈ (0,1) is repelling if θ ∗ 6= θ(δx) for each pure action x ∈ F(δθ∗)
and there is ε > 0 such that
• θ(δx)≤ θ ∗− ε for any θ ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗) and for any x ∈ F(δθ ).
• θ(δx)≥ θ ∗+ ε for any θ ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε) and for any x ∈ F(δθ ).
In words, a model θ ∗ is repelling if θ(σ (t)) moves away from θ ∗ in its neighborhood.
Indeed, the first bullet point implies that if θ(σ (t)) is slightly below θ ∗, it will move down
further at the next instant. The second bullet point implies that if θ(σ (t)) is slightly above θ ∗,
it will go up at the next instant. In Example 4, the equilibrium model θ = 13 is repelling. In the
definition above, we consider only interior models θ ∈ (0,1). This is so because whenever an
extreme point θ = 0,1 is supported by some equilibrium (i.e., there is an equilibrium σ such
that θ(σ) = θ ), there is a pure-strategy equilibrium δx supporting it.
The following proposition shows that if θ ∗ is repelling, then any equilibrium in which the
agent has a degenerate belief on this model θ ∗ is repelling; hence these equilibria do not arise
as long-run outcomes.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 5, θ ∗ ∈ (0,1) is repelling if and only if it is not supported
by a pure equilibrium, there is at least one mixed equilibrium σ∗ with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗, and all
mixed equilibria σ∗ with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗ are repelling.
Proof. See Appendix A.12.
5.5 Application: Positively reinforcing beliefs
We conclude by applying our results to a large class of economically relevant environments
where beliefs are positively reinforcing in the sense that higher beliefs lead to higher ac-
tions which in turn lead to higher beliefs. Two examples in this class are Esponda (2008)’s
economies with adverse selection, which includes applications to bilateral trade, insurance
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markets, auctions, and performance pay, and Heidhues, Ko˝szegi and Strack (2018a)’s envi-
ronment of an agent whose overconfidence biases her learning about a fundamental, which
includes applications to delegation, control in organizations, and public policy choices. In
contrast to this work, we are able to derive results without additional restrictive assumptions
of a technical nature.25
Without loss of generality, we assume the actions are ordered according to x1 < ... < x|X |.
We then make the following meaningful economic assumptions:
• Θ= [0,1]
• The identifiability conditions (i)-(ii) in Assumption 5 hold; in particular, let θ(σ) denote
the closest model given σ .
• Higher actions lead to higher beliefs: x 7→ θ(δx) is an increasing function.
• Higher beliefs lead to higher actions: Formally, the mapping θ 7→ F(δθ ) is uhc and
satisfies maxF(δθ )≤minF(δθ ′) for all θ ′ > θ .
The first assumption requires a one-dimensional space of models, but it is less restrictive than
one might imagine. In applications, θ usually represents the mean of a continuous random
variable. But, more generally, the assumption allows for non-parametric models whenever the
random variables takes a finite number of values. For example, in Esponda (2008)’s case of a
buyer who does not know the distribution over a finite number of product values, v1, ...,vK , a
model can be represented by a vector φ = (φ1, ...,φK), where φ j denotes the probability that
the value is v j. If the buyer cares about the expected value of the object, we can work with a
one-dimensional space by defining the transformation θ = ∑Kj=1φ jv j.
The second assumption is an identification condition that says that, no matter the data,
there is a unique model that best fits the data. This is a natural assumption in the class of
environments we study. Whenever it fails in applications, it is natural to refine beliefs in a
manner that the condition holds. In the buyer example, if the buyer decides to offer a price of
zero, then no trade happens. Then the buyer does not get any feedback about the value of the
product and her beliefs are unrestricted. In this case, it is common to assume that the buyer’s
belief at a price of zero is the limit, as price goes to zero, of her belief at a positive price, where
trade does happen with positive probability.
25Esponda (2008) does not generally tackle the question of convergence; this question is tackled by Heidhues,
Ko˝szegi and Strack (2018a), who establish convergence under the assumption that there is a unique equilibrium
and that the distribution of noise is log concave.
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Figure 8: Example of equilibrium with positively-reinforcing actions: The left panel shows
the correspondence of optimal actions and the right panel illustrates equilibrium.
The third assumption says that the agent’s degenerate belief increases with the action. For
example, the higher the price offered by the buyer, the higher the quality of products that she
trades and, therefore, her belief about the value of the product.
The last assumption says that the optimal action increases with the agent’s (degenerate)
belief. For example, the higher the agent’s belief about the value of the object, then the higher
the optimal price. The continuity requirement simply says that the agent must be indifferent
at beliefs where her behavior changes. The left panel of Figure 8 depicts an example of this
property.
By definition, θ ∗ is an equilibrium model if and only if θ ∗ ∈ θ(∆F(δθ∗)). As we show
in the proof of the next proposition, the mapping θ 7→ θ(∆F(δθ )) has the staircase property.
An example is depicted in the right panel of Figure 8. In the example, there are three equi-
librium models, two of which are attracting (θ ∗1 and θ
∗
3 ) and one of which is repelling (θ
∗
2 ).
The attracting models are associated with a corresponding pure-action equilibrium (x2 and
x4, respectively) while the repelling model is associated with a mixed-action equilibrium (a
combination of x3 and x4). Our previous results imply that the agent’s action converges to a
pure-action equilibrium. This is a general feature of this class of environments, as long as
pure-action equilibria are strict, a property that is generically true.
Proposition 9. If all pure-action equilibria are strict, then the action sequence (xt)t almost
surely converges to a pure-action equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix A.14.
6 Relationship to Berk-Nash equilibrium
In this section, we relate the notion of equilibrium that arises naturally from the differential
inclusion approach to EP2016’s definition of Berk-Nash equilibrium. To facilitate the com-
parison, we assume that the agent chooses optimal actions, and denote the correspondence of
optimal actions by Fβ , where β ∈ [0,1) denotes the agent’s discount factor (β = 0 is the case
of a myopic agent).
The definition of equilibrium that emerges from the differential inclusion approach is that
of a probability distribution over actions satisfying σ ∈∆Fβ (∆Θ(σ)) =∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)Fβ (µ) (see
Definition 2). Equivalently, σ is an equilibrium if and only if for every action x in the support
of σ there exists a belief µx such that x ∈ Fβ (µx). In contrast, EP2016 define a Berk-Nash
equilibrium to be a probability distribution over actions satisfying σ ∈ ∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)∆F0(µ).26
Note that σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists a belief µ such that, for
every x in the support of σ , x ∈ F0(µ).
There are two differences between the definition of equilibrium in this paper and a Berk-
Nash equilibrium: A Berk-Nash equilibrium (1) restricts actions to be supported by the same
belief; and (2) requires actions to be myopically optimal. These two properties are common
in most other standard equilibrium concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Following Fudenberg
and Levine (1993), the first property is known as the unitary-belief property, and puts restric-
tions on the set of mixed actions that can constitute an equilibrium.27 The second property
is convenient because myopic optimality is easier to characterize than general optimality. We
will show that both of these properties are natural provided the following condition holds.
Definition 8. The family of models is weakly identified given σ ∈∆X if θ ,θ ′ ∈Θ(σ) implies
that Qθ (· | x) = Qθ ′(· | x) for all x such that σ(x)> 0.
The definition of weak identification was introduced by EP2016. It says that the belief is
uniquely determined along the equilibrium path, but leaves open the possibility of multiple
beliefs for actions that are not in the support of σ . Weak identification is immediately satisfied
26This is the definition of Berk-Nash equilibrium for the single agent case; EP2016 also consider the case of
multiple agents.
27Fudenberg and Levine (1993) showed that non-unitary equilibria make sense in a game where there are
multiple players and, for each player, there is an underlying population of agents in the role of that player, and
different agents may have different experiences (hence, beliefs) about other players.
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if the agent’s family of models is correctly specified, but it is also satisfied in many of the
applications of misspecified learning in the literature; see EP2016 for further discussion.
Proposition 10. Suppose that the family of models is weakly identified given σ . Then ∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)
Fβ (µ)⊆ ∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ) F0(µ) = ∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)∆F0(µ).
Proof. See the Appendix A.15.
Proposition 10 implies that, if the agent is myopic, then equilibrium and Berk-Nash equi-
librium are equivalent concepts under weak identification. Moreover, if the agent is not my-
opic, then the set of equilibria are contained in the set of Berk-Nash equilibria.28
We conclude by relating Proposition 1 in Section 5 to one of the main results in EP2016:
They show that, if the sequence of distributions over actions converges, then it converges to
a Berk-Nash equilibrium. In our environment there is no motive for mixing, so convergence
of the sequence of distributions over actions implies that the actions converge. Propositions
1 and 10 strengthen EP2016’s conclusion by showing that, under weak identification, even
though actions may not converge, if the action frequency converges, then it converges to a
Berk-Nash equilibrium. Of course, the main contribution of this paper is to go beyond the
characterization of equilibrium and to provide tools to tackle the question of convergence and
stability.
28Of course, if the agent is not myopic, then there might be Berk-Nash equilibria that are not equilibria. This
is similar to the idea in the bandit literature that more patient agents might be willing to experiment with actions
that myopic agents would not.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we present the proofs omitted from the text. In some places, we use the fact
that θ 7→ log q(Y |x)qθ (Y |x) is finite and continuous Q(·|x)−a.s. for all x ∈ X . This fact follows from
Assumptions 1-2.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Continuity of K: For any (θ ,σ) ∈Θ×∆X take a sequence (θn,σn)n in Θ×∆X that converges
to this point. By the triangle inequality and the fact that K is finite under Assumption 2(iii) it
follows that |K(θn,σn)−K(θ ,σ)| ≤ |K(θn,σ)−K(θ ,σ)|+ |K(θn,σn)−K(θn,σ)|.
It suffices to show that both terms on the RHS vanish as n→ ∞. Regarding the first term
in the RHS, observe that for any σ ∈ ∆X , θ 7→ log q(Y |X)qθ (Y |X) is finite and continuous Q ·σ −a.s.
Under Assumption 2(iii), by the DCT this implies that θ 7→ K(θ ,σ) is continuous for any
σ ∈ ∆X . Thus limn→∞ |K(θn,σ)−K(θ ,σ)|= 0. Regarding the other term in the RHS of the
display, observe that under Assumption 2(iii)
|K(θn,σn)−K(θn,σ)| ≤ ∑
x∈X
ˆ
gx(y)Q(dy | x)|σn(x)−σ(x)|
and the RHS vanishes as
´
gx(y)Q(dy | x)< ∞ for all x ∈ X .
Finally, continuity of K, compactness of Θ (by Assumption 2(ii)) and the Theorem of the
Maximum imply that σ 7→Θ(σ) is compact-valued, uhc, and that σ 7→ K∗(σ) is continuous.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let (θ ,z) 7→ g(θ ,z)≡ log q(y|x)qθ (y|x) , where z = (y,x) ∈ Y ×X . For any θ ∈ Θ and any ε > 0, let
O(θ ,ε)≡ {θ ′ : ||θ ′−θ ||< ε}.
STEP 1. Pointwise convergence. Fix any ε > 0 and any θ ∈ Θ. For any τ ≥ 0 and history
h, let
ζτ(h)≡ sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,ε)
g(θ ′,zτ(h))−EQ(·|xτ (h))
[
sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,ε)
g(θ ′,Y,xτ(h))
]
.
The process (ζt)t is a Martingale difference under P f and the filtration generated by
{ht ≡ (x0(h),y0(h),x1(h),y1(h), ...,xt(h)) : t ≥ 0}, because EP f (·|ht) [ζt(h)] = 0 for all t. De-
fine h 7→ ζ t(h) ≡ ∑tτ=0 (1+ τ)−1 ζτ(h) for any t ≥ 0. Since (ζt)t is a Martingale difference
sequence, then (ζ t)t is also a Martingale difference.
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By the Martingale Convergence Theorem, there exist a H ⊆ H (potentially depending
on θ ∈ Θ) and ζ ∈ L2(H,R,P f ) such that P f (H ) = 1 and, for any h ∈H , ζ t(h)→ ζ (h),
provided supt EP f
[
(ζ t)2
]
< ∞. This condition is satisfied because
EP f
[(
ζ t
)2]
= EP f
[
t
∑
τ=0
(1+ τ)−2 (ζτ)2
]
+2EP f
[
∑
τ>τ ′
(1+ τ)−1
(
1+ τ ′
)−1 ζτζτ ′
]
=
t
∑
τ=0
(1+ τ)−2 EP f
[
(ζτ)2
]
≤
t
∑
τ=0
(1+ τ)−2 EP f
ˆ ( sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,ε)
g(θ ′,y,Xτ)
)2
Q(dy | Xτ)

≤C max
x∈X
ˆ
sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,ε)
(
g(θ ′,y,x)
)2 Q(dy | x) ,
where the second line follows from the fact that, for any τ > τ ′, EP f [ζτζτ ′] =EP f
[
EP f (·|hτ ) [ζτ ]ζτ ′
]
=
0, and where the last line follows from the fact that C ≡ limt→∞∑tτ=0 (1+ τ)−2 < ∞. By As-
sumption 2(iii), for any (x,y)∈X×Y , supθ ′∈O(θ ,ε) (g(θ ′,y,x))2≤ (gx(y))2 with
´
(gx(y))
2 Q(dy |
x)<∞. Thus, supt EP f
[
(ζ t)2
]
<∞. By invoking Kronecker Lemma it follows that limt→∞ (1+ t)−1∑tτ=0 ζ t =
0 P f -a.s. Therefore, we have established that, for all θ ∈Θ,
lim
t→∞(1+ t)
−1 t∑
τ=0
(
sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,ε)
g(θ ′,zτ)−EQ(·|xτ )
[
sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,ε)
g(θ ′,Y,xτ)
])
= 0 P f -a.s.
STEP 2. Uniform convergence. Observe that, for any ε > 0 and any θ ∈ Θ, there exists
δ (θ ,ε) such that
EQ(·|x)
[
sup
θ ′∈O(θ ,δ (θ ,ε))
g(θ ′,Y,x)−g(θ ,Y,x)
]
< 0.25ε (16)
for all x ∈ X . To see this claim, note that, since θ 7→ g(θ ,Y,x) is continuous Q(·|x)−a.s. for
all x ∈ X , limδ→0 supθ ′∈O(θ ,δ ) |g(θ ′,Y,x)−g(θ ,Y,x)| = 0 a.s.−Q(· | x) for all x ∈ X . Also,
by Assumption 2(iii), supθ ′∈O(θ ,δ ) |g(θ ′,y,x)−g(θ ,y,x)| ≤ 2gx(y) and
´
gx(y)Q(dy|x) < ∞,
Thus, by the DCT, limδ→0 EQ(·|x)
[
supθ ′∈O(θ ,δ ) |g(θ ′,Y,x)−g(θ ,Y,x)|
]
= 0 for all x ∈ X .
Observe that (O(θ ,δ (θ ,ε)))θ∈Θ is an open cover of Θ. By compactness of Θ, there exists
a finite sub-cover (O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))) j=1,...J(ε). Thus, for all ε > 0,
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sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣(1+ t)−1 t∑τ=0(g(θ ,zτ)−EQ(·|xτ ) [g(θ ,Y,xτ)])
∣∣∣∣∣
≤max
j
sup
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
∣∣∣∣∣(1+ t)−1 t∑τ=0(g(θ ,zτ)−EQ(·|xτ ) [g(θ ,Y,xτ)])
∣∣∣∣∣
≤max
j
(1+ t)−1
t
∑
τ=0
(
sup
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
∣∣g(θ ,zτ)−EQ(·|xτ ) [g(θ ,Y,xτ)]∣∣
)
≤max
j
(1+ t)−1
t
∑
τ=0
(∣∣∣∣∣ supθ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))g(θ ,zτ)−EQ(·|xτ )
[
inf
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
g(θ ,Y,xτ)
]∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤max
j
(1+ t)−1
t
∑
τ=0
(∣∣∣∣∣ supθ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))g(θ ,zτ)−EQ(·|xτ )
[
sup
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
g(θ ,Y,xτ)
]∣∣∣∣∣
)
+max
j
(1+ t)−1
t
∑
τ=0
(
EQ(·|xτ )
[
sup
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
g(θ ,Y,xτ)− inf
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
g(θ ,Y,xτ)
])
=I+ II.
By Step 1 and the fact that we are adding over a finite number of θ j’s, the limit as t → ∞
of the term I is equal to zero P f -a.s. For the second term, note that (16) implies that
II ≤ 2max
x∈X
ˆ
sup
θ∈O(θ j,δ (θ j,ε))
∣∣g(θ ,y,x)−g(θ j,y,x)∣∣Q(dy | x)≤ 0.5ε.
Since 0≤ II ≤ 0.5ε holds for all ε > 0, it follows that II = 0. Therefore, using the definition
of g, we have established that
lim
t→∞ supθ∈Θ
(1+ t)−1
t
∑
τ=0
(
log
q(yτ | xτ)
qθ (yτ | xτ) −EQ(·|xτ )
[
log
q(Y | xτ)
qθ (Y | xτ)
])
= 0
P f -a.s. The statement in the lemma then follows by noting that
K(θ ,σt) = ∑
x∈X
EQ(·|x)
[
log
q(Y | x)
qθ (Y | x)
]
σt(x) = (1+ t)−1
t
∑
τ=0
EQ(·|xτ )
[
log
q(Y | xτ)
qθ (Y | xτ)
]
.
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A.3 Proof of equation (8) in Theorem 1
For simplicity, set k ≡ ε/2 > 0. Continuity of (θ ,σ) 7→ K¯(θ ,σ) ≡ K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ) (see
Lemma 1(i)) and compactness of Θ×∆X imply that K¯ is uniformly continuous. For any σ ,
take some θσ ∈ Θ(σ) (this is possible because Θ(σ) is nonempty; see Lemma 1(ii)). By
uniform continuity of K¯, there exists δk > 0 such that ‖θσ −θ ′‖ < δk and ‖σ −σ ′‖ < δk
imply K¯(θ ′,σ ′) < K¯(θσ ,σ)+ k = k, where the last equality follows because K¯(θσ ,σ) = 0.
This implies that for all σ , {θ ′ : ‖θσ −θ ′‖< δk} ⊆ {θ : K¯(θ ,σ ′)≤ k} for all σ ′ ∈ B(σ ,δk)≡
{σ ′ : ‖σ −σ ′‖ < δk}. Thus, for all σ , µ0({θ : K¯(θ ,σ ′) ≤ k}) ≥ µ0({θ ′ : ‖θσ −θ ′‖ < δk})
for all σ ′ ∈ B(σ ,δk). The balls {B(σ ,δk)}σ form an open cover for ∆X . Since ∆X is compact,
there exists a finite subcover {B(σ i,δk)}ni=1. Let r ≡ mini∈{1,...,n} µ0({θ ′ : ‖θσ i−θ ′‖ < δk})
which is strictly positive by Assumption 3. Take any σ ′, there exists i such that σ ′ ∈ B(σ i,δk);
by the previous argument µ0({θ : K¯(θ ,σ ′)≤ k})≥ µ0({θ ′ : ‖θσ i−θ ′‖< δk})≥ r > 0.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of three parts. Part 1 defines an enlargement of the set of
actions that allows us to adopt the methods developed by BHS2005. Part 2 and 3 correspond
to the arguments in the proofs of Proposition 1.3 and Theorem 4.2 in BHS2005, respectively,
and we provide them here for completeness. Throughout the proof we fix a history from the
set of histories with probability 1 defined by the statement of Theorem 1; we omit the history
from the notation.
Part 1. Enlargement of the set ∆F(µ). Let S= {a−b | a,b∈∆X} and let Ξ :R+×∆X⇒ S
be defined such that, for all (δ ,σ) ∈ R+×∆X ,
Ξ(δ ,σ) =
{
y ∈ S : ∃σ
′ ∈ ∆X ,µ ′ ∈ ∆Θ s.t. y ∈ ∆F(µ ′)−σ ′,
µ ′ ∈M(δ ,σ ′),‖σ ′−σ‖ ≤ δ
}
,
where M : R+×∆X ⇒ ∆Θ is defined such that, for all (δ ,σ ′) ∈ R+×∆X ,
M(δ ,σ ′)≡ {µ ′ ∈ ∆Θ :
ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′)µ ′(dθ)≤ δ},
where K¯(θ ,σ ′)≡K(θ ,σ ′)−K∗(σ ′). Note thatΘ(0,σ)=Θ(σ) and soΞ(0,σ)=∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)∆F(µ)−
σ .
Claim 1: (δ ,σ) 7→ Ξ(δ ,σ) is uhc.
Proof. Because S is compact, it suffices to show that Ξ has the closed graph property. For
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this purpose, we will first show that (δ ,σ ′) 7→M(δ ,σ ′) is uhc. To establish this claim, note
that ∆Θ is compact because of the assumption that Θ is compact. Hence, we will show that
M has the closed graph property. Take (µ ′n)n converging to µ ′ (in the weak topology), (δn)n
converging to δ , and (σ ′n)n converging to σ ′. Suppose that µ ′n ∈M(δn,σ ′n) for all n. We will
show that µ ′ ∈M(δ ,σ ′). Since (µ ′n)n converges (weakly) to µ ′ and K¯(θ , ·) is continuous (see
Lemma 1), it follows that
lim
n
(ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′n)µ
′
n(dθ)−
ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′)µ ′(dθ)
)
= lim
n
(ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′n)µ
′
n(dθ)−
ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′)µ ′n(dθ)
)
+ lim
n
(ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′)µ ′n(dθ)−
ˆ
Θ
K¯(θ ,σ ′)µ ′(dθ)
)
= 0.
Also, since µ ′n ∈M(δn,σ ′n), then
´
Θ K¯(θ ,σ
′
n)µ ′n(dθ)≤ δn. Taking limits of this last expression
on both sides, we obtain
´
Θ K¯(θ ,σ
′)µ ′(dθ)≤ δ , implying that µ ′ ∈M(δ ,σ ′).
Next, to show that Ξ has the closed graph property, take (yn)n converging to y, (δn)n
converging to δ , and (σn)n converging to σ . Suppose that yn ∈ Ξ(δn,σn) for all n. We will
show that y ∈ Ξ(δ ,σ). Since yn ∈ Ξ(δn,σn) for all n, there exists a sequence (µ ′n,σ ′n)n such
that yn ∈ ∆F(µ ′n)−σ ′n, ‖σ ′n−σn‖ ≤ δn, and µ ′n ∈M(δn,σ ′n). Because the sequence (µn,σ ′n)n
lives in a compact set, ∆Θ×∆X , there exists a subsequence, (µ ′n(k),σ ′n(k))k that converges to
(µ ′,σ ′). By uhc of M and of µ 7→ ∆F(µ) (due to the assumption that F is uhc), it follows that
y ∈ ∆F(µ ′)−σ ′,‖σ ′−σ‖ ≤ δ , and µ ′ ∈M(δ ,σ ′). Thus, y ∈ Ξ(δ ,σ).
Claim 2: There exists a sequence (δt)t with limt→∞ δt = 0 such that, for all t, σt+1−σt ∈
1
t+1Ξ(δt ,σt).
Proof. By equation (11) in the text, σt+1−σt ∈ 1t+1(∆F(µt+1)−σt) for all t. By Theorem
1, there exists a sequence (δt)t with limt→∞ δt = 0 such that, for all t,
´
Θ K¯(θ ,σt)µt+1(dθ)≤
δt . Thus, ∆F(µt+1)−σt ⊆ Ξ(δt ,σt) for all t, and the claim follows.
Part 2. The interpolation of (σt)t is what BHS2005 call a perturbed solution of the differ-
ential inclusion. Define m(t)≡ sup{k≥ 0 : t ≥ τk}, where τ0 = 0 and τk =∑ki=1 1/i. Let w be
the continuous-time interpolation of (σt)t , as defined in equation (12) in the text. By Claim
2, for any t, w(t) ∈ σm(t)+(t− τm(t))Ξ(δm(t),σm(t)); hence, w˙(t) ∈ Ξ(δm(t),σm(t)) for almost
every t. Let γ(t) ≡ δm(t)+
∥∥w(t)−σm(t)∥∥. Then w˙(t) ∈ Ξ(γ(t),w(t)) for almost every t. In
addition, note that limt→∞ γ(t) = 0 because (δt)t goes to zero, m(t) goes to infinity, and w is
the interpolation of (σt)t .
Part 3. A perturbed solution is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory (i.e., it satisfies equation
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(14) in the text). Let v(t)≡ w˙(t) ∈ Ξ(γ(t),w(t)) for almost every t. Then
w(t+ s)−w(t) =
ˆ s
0
v(t+ τ)dτ. (17)
Since S is a bounded set, v is uniformly bounded; therefore, w is uniformly continuous. Hence,
the family of functions {s 7→ St(w)(s) : t ∈ R}— where for each (t,s) St(w)(s) =w(s+ t) —
is equicontinuous and, therefore, relatively compact with respect to L∞(R,∆X ,Leb), where
Leb is the Lebesgue measure; all Lp spaces in the proof are with respect to Lebesgue, so
we drop it from subsequent notation. Therefore, there exists a subsequence (tn)n and a w∗ ∈
L∞(R,∆X) such that w∗ = limtn→∞Stn(w).
Set t = tn in (17) and define vn(s) = v(tn+ s). Then
w∗(s)−w∗(0) = lim
n→∞
ˆ s
0
vn(τ)dτ.
Since vn ∈ L∞(R,S) for all n, then vn ∈ L2([0,T ],S). By the Banach-Alouglu Theorem, there
exists a subsequence, which we still denote as (tn)n, and a v∗ ∈ L2([0,T ],S) such that (vn)n
converges in the weak topology to v∗; therefore,
lim
n→∞
ˆ s
0
vn(τ)dτ =
ˆ s
0
v∗(τ)dτ (18)
pointwise in s∈ [0,T ]. Indeed, convergence is uniform because the family {s 7→ ´ s0 vn(τ)dτ : n ∈ N}
is equicontinuous and [0,T ] is compact. In addition, v∗ ∈ L2([0,T ],S), then w∗ is absolutely
continuous in [0,T ].
The proof concludes by showing the claim that v∗(τ)∈∆F(∆Θ(w∗(τ)))−w∗(τ) Lebesgue-
a.s. in τ ∈ [0,T ]. We will prove it by showing that v∗(τ) ∈Co(Ξ(0,w∗(τ))) Lebesgue-a.s. in
τ ∈ [0,T ], where Co denotes the convex hull; the desired claim then follows because the facts
that ∆F(∆Θ(σ))−σ is a convex set and contains Ξ(0,σ) and, by definition, Co(Ξ(0,σ)) is
the smallest convex set that contains Ξ(0,σ), imply that Co(Ξ(0,σ))⊆ ∆F(∆Θ(σ))−σ .
We will prove v∗(τ) ∈ Co(Ξ(0,w∗(τ))) Lebesgue-a.s., in several steps. First, we show
that weak convergence of (vn)n to v∗ implies almost sure convergence of a weighted average
of (vn)n to v∗. Formally, by Mazur’s Lemma, for each n ∈ N, there exists a N(n) ∈ N and a
non-negative vector, (αn, ...,αN(n)), such that ∑
N(n)
i=n αi = 1, and limn→∞ ‖v¯n− v∗‖L2([0,T ],S) = 0
where v¯n≡∑N(n)k=n αkvn. Therefore, as limn→∞ ‖v¯n− v∗‖L2([0,T ],S)= 0, it follows that limn→∞ v¯n =
v∗ a.s.-Lebesgue.
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Fix τ ∈ [0,T ] such that the previous claim holds. Define γn(τ) ≡ γ(tn + τ) and wn(τ) ≡
w(tn+ τ). By uhc of Ξ at (0,σ) for all σ (see Claim 1 in Part 1) and the facts that γn(τ)→ 0
and wn(τ)→ w∗(τ), it follows that, for any ε > 0, there exists Nε such that, for all n ≥ Nε ,
Ξ(γn(τ),wn(τ))⊆Ξε(0,w∗(τ)), whereΞε(0,w∗(τ))≡{y′ ∈S : ‖y′− y‖≤ ε,y∈Ξ(0,w∗(τ))}.
Recall that vn(τ) ∈ Ξ(γn(τ),wn(τ)) for all n; therefore, v¯n(τ) ∈ Co(Ξε(0,w∗(τ))) for all
n ≥ Nε . Since Co(Ξε(0,w∗(τ))) is closed and lim j→∞ v¯n(τ) = v∗(τ), it follows that v∗(τ) ∈
Co(Ξε(0,w∗(τ))). Since this is true for all ε > 0, it follows that v∗(τ) ∈Co(Ξ(0,w∗(τ))).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Let σ∗ be an arbitrary non-equilibrium point. Then there is a pure action x such that σ∗(x)> 0
and x /∈ F(4Θ(σ∗)). Choose such x. By upper hemi-continuity of F (Assumption 4) andΘ(·)
(Lemma 1) it follows that there exists a ε > 0 such that x /∈ F(4Θ(σ)) for all σ ∈ Bε(σ∗)
and such that infσ∈Bε (σ∗)σ(x) > 0. Pick such ε > 0. Then there is some T > 0 such that for
any initial value in this ε-neighborhood, σ (0) ∈ Bε(σ∗) and any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0) to the
differential inclusion leaves this neighborhood within time T , i.e., we have
‖σ (τ)−σ∗‖ ≥ ε (19)
for some τ < T . Such T exists, because the share of the action x decreases whenever σ (τ) is
in the set Bε(σ∗).
Now, pick a sample path h such that the property stated in Theorem 2 holds. We will show
that σt cannot stay in the ε2 -neighborhood of σ
∗ forever. This completes the proof, because it
implies that almost surely, σt cannot converge to any non-equilibrium point σ∗.
Pick T˜ such that for any time t > T˜ ,
inf
σ∈STw(t)
‖w(t+ s)−σ (s)‖< ε
2
∀s ∈ [0,T ] (20)
Suppose there exists a t > T˜ such that w(t) ∈ B ε
2
(σ∗) (if no such t exists, then the proof is
finished because it follows that σt is outside a ε/2 neighborhood of σ∗ for all t > T˜ ). Then
from (19) and (20), there is s ∈ [0,T ] such that ‖w(t + s)−σ∗‖ ≥ ε/2. So σt cannot stay in
the (ε/2)-neighborhood forever.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) directly follows from part (ii). Proof of part (ii): Pick a history from the set of histories
with probability one defined by the statement of Theorem 2, and let w denote the interpolation
of the action frequency σt given this path. If there is t∗ such that w(t) ∈ E for all t > t∗, the
result follows. So we will focus on the case in which for any t∗, there is t > t∗ such that
w(t) /∈ E.
Pick attracting sets (A1, · · · ,AN) as stated. Pick an arbitrarily small ε > 0. Without loss of
generality, we assume that for each attracting set An, the ε-neighborhood of An is in the basin
of attraction UAn .
Pick T large enough that for any attracting set An, for any initial value σ (0)∈UAn , for any
σ 2Tσ (0), and for any s ∈ [T,2T ],
d(σ (s),An)<
ε
2
. (21)
Also, pick T˜ large enough that for any t > T˜ and for any s ∈ [0,2T ]
inf
σ∈S2Tw(t)
‖w(t+ s)−σ (s)‖< ε
2
. (22)
Recall that for any t∗, there is t > t∗ such that w(t) /∈ E. This implies that there is t > T˜
and an attracting set An such that w(t) ∈ UAn . Pick such t and An. From (21) and (22), we
have d(w(t+s),An)< ε for all s∈ [T,2T ]. This implies that w(t+s)∈UAn for all s∈ [T,2T ],
so applying the same argument iteratively, we have d(w(t + s),An) < ε for all s ≥ T , which
means that w will stay in the ε-neighborhood of the attracting set An forever. Since ε can be
arbitrarily small, d(w(t)−An) converges to zero as t→∞. (Note that choosing smaller ε does
not influence An.)
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Let σ∗ be a repelling equilibrium, and pick U and T as in the definition of repelling equilib-
rium. Pick a history from the set of histories with probability one defined by the statements of
Theorems 1 and 2. Let w denote the interpolation of the action frequency σt given this path.
It suffices to show that w(t) does not converge to σ∗ given this history.
Pick a sufficiently small ε > 0, so that 2ε-neighborhood of σ∗ is a subset of U . Without
loss of generality, we can assume that there is η > 0 such that F(µ)⊆ F(4Θ(σ∗)) for any µ
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such that
´
(K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ))µ(dθ)< η for some σ ∈ Bε(σ∗). (If necessary, take ε small.)
Pick such η > 0.
From Theorems 1 and 2, there is T ∗ and τ∗ such that T ∗ = ∑τ
∗
i=1
1
i ,
ˆ
(K(θ ,στ)−K∗(στ))µτ+1(dθ)< η (23)
for all τ ≥ τ∗, and
inf
σ∈STw(t)
sup
0≤s≤T
‖w(t+ s)−σ (s)‖< ε (24)
for all t ≥ T ∗.
Suppose that w(t) is in the ε-neighborhood of σ∗ for some t > T ∗ such that t =∑τi=1
1
i for
some τ . We will show that there is t ′ > 0 such that w(t + t ′) is not in the ε-neighborhood of
σ∗. This completes the proof, because it implies that w cannot stay around σ∗ forever. Let
σ = w(t) satisfy the condition in the definition of repelling equilibrium. From (23) and the
definition of η , the agent chooses some action x ∈ F(4Θ(σ∗)) in the current period. This
means that w(t˜) moves toward δx during the time t˜ ∈ [t, t + 1τ+1 ]. Then from the condition in
the definition of repelling equilibrium, there is t˜ ∈ [t, t + 1τ+1 ] such that for any σ ∈ S∞w(t˜), we
have σ (t) /∈ U for some t ∈ [0,T ]. Then as in the previous case, we can show that there is
t ′ ≤ T such that ‖w(t˜+ t ′)−σ‖> ε , as desired.
A.8 Attracting Sets Need Not Be Robustly Attracting
The agent has three actions, x1, x2, and x3. Given an action xk, a consequence y is randomly
drawn from Y = R3 according to the normal distribution N(ek, I), so the action influences the
mean of the consequence y. However, the agent does not recognize that the action influences
the consequence. Her model space is the probability simplex Θ=4X , and for each model θ ,
she believes that the consequence follows the normal distribution N(θ , I). So given a mixture
σ ∈4X , the closest model is θ = σ , i.e., Θ(σ) = {σ} for each σ .
For each degenerate belief δθ , the optimal policy is given as follows. Consider the model
space Θ, and choose the points A = (23 ,0,
1
3), B = (
1
3 ,
2
3 ,0), C = (0,
1
3 ,
2
3), and σ
∗ = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3)
as in Figure 9. For each model θ in the interior of the triangle ABσ∗, F(δθ ) = {x2}, i.e.,
the optimal policy is x2 if the belief puts probability one on some model θ in this triangle.
Similarly, the optimal action is x3 for the triangle BCσ∗, and x1 for the triangle CAσ∗. For the
point σ∗ and the models outside the triangle ABC, all actions are optimal, that is, F(δθ ) = X
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for these models θ . For all models on the boundary of the triangles, the optimal policy is
chosen in such a way that F(δθ ) is upper hemi-continuous with respect to θ . For example, on
the line Aσ∗, F(δθ ) = {x1,x2}.
e1
A
e2
e3
B
C
x2
x3
x1
σ∗
6
Figure 9: Policy F(δθ ) for each model θ
x1
A= a1
x2
x3
B
C
b1
c1
a2
b2
7
Figure 10: Path starting from a1.
In this example, the model θ = σ∗ is an attracting equilibrium, and its basin of attraction
is the interior of the triangle ABC. For example, suppose that the action frequency so far is the
point a1 = A, and the action x2 is chosen today. Then the new action frequency is an interior
point of the triangle ABσ∗, and the agent chooses x2 until the action frequency hits the point
b1 = (13 ,
1
2 ,
1
6) on the line Bσ
∗. After that, the agent chooses the action x3 until the action
frequency hits the point c1 = (29 ,
1
3 ,
4
9) on the line Cσ
∗; then the agent chooses the action x1
until the action frequency hits the point a2 = ( 512 ,
1
4 ,
1
3). From there on, the solution to the
differential inclusion takes the path a2b2c2a3b3c3 · · · and converges to σ∗, where
an = (a1n,a
2
n,a
3
n) =
(
1− 1
3
− 1
9c3n−1
,
1
9c3n−1
,
1
3
)
bn = (b1n,b
2
n,b
3
n) =
(
1
3
,1− 1
3
− 1
9a1n
,
1
9a1n
)
cn = (c1n,c
2
n,c
3
n) =
(
1
9b2n
,
1
3
,1− 1
3
− 1
9b2n
)
.
See Figure 10. Similarly, starting from any interior points of the triangle ABC, any solution σ
to the differential inclusion will eventually converge to σ∗.
Now we will modify this example in such a way that the equilibrium σ∗ is still attracting
but not robustly attracting. Take the points d0, d1, · · · as in Figure 11, that is, d0 is the inter-
section point of the line AB and the line passing through σ∗ and C, and for each n ≥ 1, dn is
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the intersection point of the line anbn and the line passing through σ∗ and C. Then take the
sequence (z0,z1, · · ·) such that z0 = d1, z1 = (d11 , d
2
1+d
2
2
2 ,1− d11 −
d21+d
2
2
2 ), and zk =
zk−2+d2
2 for
each k≥ 2. Intuitively, z0z1 · · · is a “jagged bridge” which connects d1 and d2, whose step size
shrinks as it goes. See Figure 12.
x1
A= a1
x2
x3
B
C
d0
d1 d2
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Figure 11: Policy F(δθ ) for each model θ
z0 = d1
d2
z1
z2 z3
z4 z5
z6
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Figure 12: Jagged path. It does not reach d2.
Assume that for each model θ on this bridge z0z1z2 · · · , the optimal policy is F(δθ ) =
{x1,x2}. Then starting from any point on this bridge z0z1 · · · , a solution σ to the differential
inclusion can move along this bridge and reach the point d1. However, starting from the point
d2, σ cannot move to d1; this is so because for every large n, zn is slightly different from
d2, which means that the bridge z0z1 · · · do not reach the point d2 exactly. Accordingly, the
asymptotic motion of σ is the same as before, i.e., as long as the starting point is in the interior
of the triangle ABC, σ converges to σ∗.
The same is true even if we add more bridges. Suppose that for each n, there is a jagged
path from dn toward dn+1. Even with this change, σ∗ is still attracting, for example, starting
from the point b1, σ must follow the path b1c1a2b2c2 · · · and eventually converge to σ∗.
However, adding these bridges significantly changes the solution σ˜ to the perturbed dif-
ferential inclusion. Indeed, starting from the point dn, σ˜ can move to dn−1 through the jagged
path, because this path is ε-close to the point dn for any small ε . For the same reason, σ˜ can
move to dn−2, dn−3, · · · , and can eventually reach the point d0, which is outside of the basin
of σ∗. This implies that σ∗ is not robustly attracting with these bridges.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
We will first present a few preliminary results. We have seen in Lemma 2 that given any initial
prior µ0 and given any policy f , there is T such that with positive probability, the consequence
frequency is close to the mean (more formally, the sample average of the likelihood Lt is close
to the mean) for all periods after T . The following claim shows that this T can be chosen
independently of µ0 and f . The proof can be found at the end.
Claim 1. For any η > 0, there is T and q > 0 such that for any initial prior µ0 with full
support and for any f ,
P f (∀t ≥ T∀θ |Lt(θ)−K(θ ,σt)|< η)> q. (25)
The next claim just summarizes what we have seen in the proof of Theorem 1: It shows that
if the past consequence frequency is close to the mean as stated in the above claim, and if the
initial prior µ0 satisfies some technical condition, then the posterior belief µt+1 concentrates
on the states which approximately minimize K(θ ,σt) for large t.
Claim 2. For any η > 0 and for any κ > 0, there is T such that for any initial prior µ0 and
for any t > T such that |Lt(θ)−K(θ ,σt)|< η16 and µ0({θ : K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt)≤ η4 })≥ κ ,
ˆ
(K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt))µt+1(dθ)< η .
Proof. Directly follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
The next claim shows that if the posterior belief µt+1 is concentrated as stated in the above
claim then the motion of the action frequency σt is described by the perturbed differential
inclusion. A difference from Theorem 2 is that here the motion of the action frequency w
exactly matches a solution to the perturbed differential inclusion. In contrast, in Theorem 2,
we take the limit as t → ∞, so a solution to the differential inclusion is an approximation of
the action frequency w.
Claim 3. Let F be an uhc policy correspondence. Then for any ε > 0, there is η > 0 such
that given a sample path h, for any t > 1ε such that
´
(K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt))µt(dθ)< η , there is
σ ∈ S∞,εw(T ) such that w(T + s) = σ (s) for all s ∈ [0, 1t+1 ], where T = ∑tτ=1 1τ .
Proof. Pick ε > 0 arbitrarily. It is sufficient to show that there is η > 0 such that for any
σ and for any µ such that
´
(K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ))µ(dθ) < η , there is σ˜ ∈ B ε
2
(σ) such that
F(µ)⊆ F(4Θ(σ˜)).
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Note that for each σ , there is εσ < ε and ησ such that F(µ) ⊆ F(4Θ(σ)) for all µ such
that
´
(K(θ , σ˜)−K∗(σ˜))µ(dθ) < ησ for some σ˜ ∈ Bεσ (σ). Since 4X is compact, there
is a finite subcover {Bεσ1 (σ1), · · · ,BεσM (σM)}. Let η = minmησm > 0. This η satisfies the
property we want. Indeed, for any σ and µ such that
´
(K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ))µ(dθ) < η , if we
set σ˜ = σm such that σ ∈ Bεσm (σm), we have F(µ)⊆ F(4Θ(σ˜)).
The next claim shows that to prove convergence to an attracting set A, it suffices to show
that σt visits the basin of A infinitely often with positive probability.
Claim 4. Suppose that given an initial prior µ0 and a policy f , σt visits the basin of A infinitely
often with positive probability, i.e., P f (∀T∃t > T σt ∈UA)> 0. Then P f (limt→∞ d(σt ,A) =
0)> 0.
Proof. Let H be the set of all h which satisfies the property stated in Theorem 1. Note
that P f (H ) = 1. Also, let H˜ be the set of all h such that σt visits the basin of A infinitely
often, i.e., it is the set of all h such that for any T , there is t > T such that σt ∈ UA. Let
H ∗ =H ∩H˜ . By the assumption, we have P f (H ∗) = P f (H˜ )> 0.
Pick a sample path h∈H ∗. To prove the claim, it suffices to show that limt→∞ d(σt ,A)= 0
given this path. Pick an arbitrary ε > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that Bε(A) is
in the basin of attraction UA.
Pick T large enough that (21) holds for any initial value σ (0) ∈ UA, for any σ ∈ S2Tσ (0),
and for any s ∈ [T,2T ]. Also, pick T˜ large enough that (22) holds for any t > T˜ and for any
s ∈ [0,2T ].
Since σt visits UA infinitely often, there is t > T˜ such that w(t) ∈UA. Pick such t. Then
as in the proof of Proposition 2(ii), we can show that w will stay in the ε-neighborhood of the
set A forever. Since ε can be arbitrarily small, limt→∞ d(w(t),A) = 0.
Now we will prove the proposition. Let A be a robustly attracting set, and let ζ > 0 be
such that Bζ (A)⊂UA. Let ζ and ε be as in the definition of robustly attracting set. Then pick
η as in Claim 3, pick an arbitrary κ > 0, and pick T as stated in Claim 2.
Pick t∗ large enough that 1t∗ < ε and
t∗
t∗+T
σ +
T
t∗+T
σ˜ ∈ Bζ (A) (26)
for all σ ∈ B ζ
2
(A) and σ˜ ∈4X . Now, consider the following hypothetical situation:
(a) The initial prior is µ0 such that µ0({θ : K(θ ,σ)−K∗(σ) ≤ η4 }) > κ for all σ . The
current period is t∗+1.
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(b) The action frequency in the past is close to A, in that σt∗ ∈ B ζ
2
(A).
(c) The past observation is close to the mean, in that |Lt∗(θ)−K(θ ,σt∗)|< η16 for all θ .29
Let ht
∗
be a history which satisfies all the properties above. (Given a policy f , the probability
of such a history ht
∗
may be zero, but this does not affect the following argument.) LetH be
the set of histories such that the history during the first t∗ periods is exactly ht∗ and
|Lt∗+1,t(θ)−K(θ ,σt∗+1,t)|< η16 (27)
for all t ≥ t∗+T , where Lt∗+1,t is the sample average of the likelihood from period t∗+ 1 to
period t, and σt∗+1,t is the action frequency from period t∗+1 to period t. From Claim 1, we
know P f (H |ht∗)> q.
Pick a path h ∈H . We claim that given this path, σt never leaves the basin of A after
period t∗. The proof can be found at the end.
Claim 5. For each path h ∈H , σt ∈UA for all t > t∗.
Let µ∗ be the posterior belief induced by the initial prior µ0 and the history ht
∗
above.
Now, consider a new game in which the agent’s initial prior is µ∗. Since the agent’s action
is determined by the belief, her play in this new game is exactly the same as her play in the
continuation game induced by the initial prior µ0 and the history ht
∗
. So Claim 5 implies that
in this new game, with positive probability, the action frequency σt will stay in the basin UA
in all periods t > T˜ , where T˜ is a sufficiently large number. (This is so because the action
frequency σt∗ during the first t∗ periods has almost no impact on the action frequency σt for
large t.) Then Claim 4 implies that in this new game, the action frequency σt converges to A
with positive probability.
A.9.1 Proof of Claim 1
Let Px denote the probability distribution of the histories h=(xt ,yt)∞t=1 when the agent chooses
x every period,
Claim 6. For any η > 0, there is T such that for any action x,
Px(∀t ≥ T∀θ |Lt(θ)−K(θ ,x)|< η)> 0
29Claim 1 ensures that this condition can be satisfied by some consequence sequence.
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Proof. Pick any η > 0. From Lemma 2, limT→∞Px(∀t ≥ T∀θ |Lt(θ)−K(θ ,x)|< η) = 1.
This implies the result we want.
Now we will prove Claim 1. Let Lt(θ ,x) = 1tσt(x)∑
t
τ=1 1{xτ=x} log
q(yt |xt)
qθ (yt |xt) be the sample
average of the likelihood ratio, where the sample is taken from the periods in which the agent
chooses x. Note that we have Lt(θ) = ∑x∈X σt(x)Lt(θ ,x).
Pick η > 0 arbitrarily, and pick T as in the above claim. Let H be the set of histories h
such that |Lt(θ ,x)−K(θ ,x)|< η for all x and t such that tσt(x)> T . Then there is q > 0 such
that P f (H )> q for any initial prior µ0 and any policy f .
Pick an arbitrary h ∈H , and let ξ > 0 be such that
∣∣∣log q(y|x)qθ (y|x) − log q(y˜|x)qθ (y˜|x)∣∣∣< ξ for all x,
θ , y, and y˜. Then we have
|Lt(θ ,x)−K(θ ,x)|<
{
η if tσt(x)> T
ξ otherwise
for all x, θ , and t. This implies that σt(x)|Lt(θ ,x)−K(θ ,x)| < max{η , Tξt }. So for any
t > T ∗ ≡ Tξε , we have σt(x)|Lt(θ ,x)−K(θ ,x)|< η . Hence for any t > T ∗,
|Lt(θ)−K(θ ,σt)| ≤ ∑
x∈X
σt(x)|Lt(θ ,x)−K(θ ,x)|< η .
Since K and T ∗ are chosen independently of h ∈H , this implies the result we want.
A.9.2 Proof of Claim 5
Pick h as stated. From (b) and (26), we have σt ∈ Bζ (A)⊆UA for all t ∈ {t∗+1, · · · , t∗+T},
regardless of the agent’s play during these periods.
So what remains is to show that σt ∈UA for all t > t∗+T . From (27), (a), (c), and Claim
2, we have
´
(K(θ ,σt)−K∗(σt))µt+1(dθ) < η for all t ≥ t∗+T . Then Claim 3 implies that
the motion of the action frequency after period t∗+ T is described by some solution to the
ε-perturbed differential inclusion. Since σt+T ∗ ∈ Bζ (A) and σ∗ is robustly attracting, we have
σt ∈ Bζ (A)⊆UA for all t ≥ t∗+T .
A.10 Proof of Proposition 5
We will start with a useful lemma, which shows that Assumption 5 essentially requires single-
peakedness of the Kullback-Leibler divergence K(θ ,δx). Let θ = minσ∈4X θ(σ), and let
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θ = maxσ∈4X θ(σ). Then we have the following lemma. The proof can be found at the end.
Lemma 1. If Assumption 5 holds, then for each action frequency σ , the Kullback-Leibler
divergence K(θ ,σ) is single-peaked with respect to θ in [θ ,θ ], that is, we have K(θ ,σ) >
K(θ˜ ,σ) for each θ ∈ [θ ,θ(σ)) and θ˜ ∈ (θ ,θ(σ)], and K(θ ,σ) < K(θ˜ ,σ) for each θ ∈
[θ(σ),θ) and θ˜ ∈ (θ ,θ ].
Proof of Lemma 1: We first prove the following claim:
Claim 7. Under Assumption 5, for each σ and σ˜ such that θ(σ) > θ(σ˜), K(θ ,σ) is strictly
decreasing with respect to θ in [θ(σ˜),θ(σ)], and K(θ , σ˜) is strictly increasing with respect
to θ in [θ(σ˜),θ(σ)].
Proof. Pick σ and σ˜ as stated. For each β ∈ [0,1], let σβ = βσ +(1−β )σ˜ .
We will prove only that K(θ ,σ) is strictly decreasing with respect to θ on [θ(σ˜),θ(σ)].
Suppose not, so that there is θ ′, θ ′′ ∈ [θ(σ˜),θ(σ)] such that θ ′< θ ′′ and K(θ ′,σ)≤K(θ ′′,σ).
We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: K(θ ′, σ˜)≤ K(θ ′′, σ˜). In this case, K(θ ′,σβ )≤ K(θ ′′,σβ ) for all β , so θ ′′ cannot
be the unique minimizer of K(θ ,σβ ), i.e., θ(σβ ) 6= θ ′′ for all β . But this is a contradiction,
because θ(σβ ) is continuous in β and θ(σ0)≤ θ ′′ ≤ θ(σ1).
Case 2: K(θ ′, σ˜)>K(θ ′′, σ˜). Let β ′ be such that θ(σβ ′) = θ ′. Then we have K(θ ′,σβ ′)<
K(θ ′′,σβ ′), which is equivalent to
β ′(K(θ ′,σ)−K(θ ′′,σ))< (1−β ′)(K(θ ′′, σ˜)−K(θ ′, σ˜)).
Then for all β ≥ β ′,
β (K(θ ′,σ)−K(θ ′′,σ))< (1−β )(K(θ ′′, σ˜)−K(θ ′, σ˜)),
which implies K(θ ′,σβ )< K(θ ′′,σβ ). So θ(σβ ) 6= θ ′′ for all β ≥ β ′. But this is a contradic-
tion, because θ(σβ ) is continuous in β and θ(σβ ′)< θ ′′ < θ(σ1).
Pick an arbitrary σ∗. We will show that the Kullback-Leibler divergence K(θ ,σ∗) is
single-peaked in [θ ,θ ]. First, consider the case in which θ(σ∗) = θ . Let σ˜ = σ∗, and let σ be
such that θ(σ) = θ . Then from the claim above, K(θ ,σ∗) is strictly increasing with respect
to θ in [θ ,θ ], which implies single-peakedness.
Next, consider the case in which θ(σ∗)< θ . Let σ˜ = σ∗, and let σ be such that θ(σ) = θ .
Then from the claim above, K(θ ,σ∗) is strictly increasing with respect to θ in [θ(σ∗),θ ].
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Similarly, letting σ = σ∗ and σ˜ be such that θ(σ˜) = θ , the claim above implies that K(θ ,σ∗)
is strictly decreasing with respect to θ in [θ ,θ(σ∗)]. Hence K(θ ,σ∗) is single-peaked.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Part (i): A standard algebra shows that
K(θ ,σβ ) = βK(θ ,σ)+(1−β )K(θ , σ˜)
for each θ . Then the result follows immediately.
Part (ii): We first show that θ(σβ )≥ θ(σ˜) for all β . Suppose not so that there is β1 ∈ (0,1)
such that θ(σβ1)< θ(σ˜). Then since θ(σβ ) is continuous in β and θ(σβ1)< θ(σ˜)< θ(σ1),
there must be some β2 such that β1 < β2 < 1 and θ(σβ2) = θ(σ˜). But then from part (i), we
have θ(σβ )= θ(σ˜) for all β ∈ [0,β2], and in particular θ(σβ1)= θ(σ˜). This is a contradiction.
Similarly, we can show that θ(σβ ) ≤ θ(σ) for all β . Taken together, we have θ(σβ ) ∈
[θ(σ˜),θ(σ)] for all β . Now, from Claim 7 in the proof of Lemma 1, K(θ ,σ) has increasing
differences, in that
∂ 2K(θ ,σ)
∂θ∂β
=
∂K(θ ,σ)
∂θ
− ∂K(θ , σ˜)
∂θ
≥ 0.
for all β and θ ∈ [θ(σ˜),θ(σ)]. So the monotone selection theorem of Topkis implies the
result we want.
Part (iii): Pick β1 and β2 as stated. Let θ ∗ = θ(σβ1). This θ
∗ is an interior solution, so it
must solve the first-order condition
∂K(θ∗,σβ1)
∂θ = 0, which is equivalent to
β1
∂K(θ ∗,σ)
∂θ
+(1−β1)∂K(θ
∗, σ˜)
∂θ
= 0. (28)
We claim that each term in the left-hand side is non-zero:
Claim 8. ∂K(θ
∗,σ)
∂θ 6= 0.
Proof. Suppose not so that ∂K(θ
∗,σ)
∂θ = 0. Then from (28), we have
∂K(θ∗,σ˜)
∂θ = 0, that is, θ
∗
satisfies the first-order condition for σ and σ˜ . Then we must have ∂
2K(θ∗,σ)
∂θ2 ≥ 0. Indeed, if
not and ∂
2K(θ∗,σ)
∂θ2 < 0, θ
∗ becomes the local maxima for K(θ ,σ), which contradicts with the
single-peakedness of K(θ ,σ). Similarly we have ∂
2K(θ∗,σ˜)
∂θ2 ≥ 0
Also, from Assumption 5, we know that the second-order condition,
∂ 2K(θ∗,σβ1)
∂θ2 > 0, is
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satisfied for σβ1 , which is equivalent to
β1
∂ 2K(θ ∗,σ)
∂θ 2
+(1−β1)∂
2K(θ ∗, σ˜)
∂θ 2
> 0.
This inequality implies ∂
2K(θ∗,σ)
∂θ2 > 0 or
∂ 2K(θ∗,σ˜)
∂θ2 > 0. Suppose for now that
∂ 2K(θ∗,σ)
∂θ2 > 0.
(The argument for the case with ∂
2K(θ∗,σ˜)
∂θ2 > 0 is symmetric, so we will omit it.) Then since
∂ 2K(θ∗,σ˜)
∂θ2 ≥ 0, we have
∂ 2K(θ∗,σβ )
∂θ2 > 0 for all β 6= 0. Also, since
∂K(θ∗,σ)
∂θ =
∂K(θ∗,σ˜)
∂θ = 0,
we have
∂K(θ∗,σβ )
∂θ = 0 for all β . So θ
∗ satisfies both the first-order and the second-order
conditions, which implies that θ(σβ ) = θ ∗ for all β 6= 0. Then since θ(σβ ) is continuous
in β , we have θ(σβ ) = θ ∗ for all β ∈ [0,1]. But this is a contradiction, because we have
θ(σ˜)< θ(σ).
The above claim and (28) imply that
∂K(θ ∗,σβ2)
∂θ
= β2
∂K(θ ∗,σ)
∂θ
+(1−β2)∂K(θ
∗, σ˜)
∂θ
6= 0,
which means that θ ∗ cannot be the optimal solution for β2. (Note that θ ∗ is an interior value,
so the first-order condition is necessary for it to be optimal.) Then from part (ii), the result
follows.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Let Θ∗∗ be the union of the equilibrium models and the boundary points, that is, Θ∗∗ = Θ∗∪
{0,1}. Since Θ∗ is finite, it can be written as Θ∗∗ = {θ0,θ1, · · · ,θN} where 0 = θ0 < · · · <
θN = 1.
We first show that each interval (θn,θn+1) has a useful property.
Lemma 3. Each interval (θn,θn+1) must satisfy one of the following properties:
(i) For each θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) and for each x ∈ F(δθ ), we have θ(δx)> θ .
(ii) For each θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) and for each x ∈ F(δθ ), we have θ(δx)< θ .
Proof. If there is θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) such that θ(δx) = θ for some x ∈ F(δθ ), then this θ is an
equilibrium model, which is a contradiction. So such θ does not exist.
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Similarly, if there is θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) such that θ(δx)< θ < θ(δx˜) for some x, x˜∈F(δθ ), then
there is a mixture σ of x and x˜ such that θ(σ) = θ , which implies that θ is a mixed-strategy
equilibrium model. So again such θ does not exist.
Accordingly, (θn,θn+1) must be the union of the two sets, Θ1 and Θ2: Θ1 is the set of all
θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) such that θ(δx) > θ for all x ∈ F(δθ ). Θ2 is the set of all θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) such
that θ(δx)< θ for all x ∈ F(δθ ). However, since F(δθ ) is upper hemi-continuous in θ , one of
these sets must be empty. This implies the result.
Next, we characterize how the KL minimizer θ(σt) changes over time, when the motion of
σt is determined by the differential inclusion. Consider an interval (θn,θn+1) which satisfies
property (i) in the lemma above. Pick a solution σ to the differential inclusion, and suppose
that θ(σ (t))∈ (θn,θn+1) in the current period t. Then from property (i), the agent will choose
an action x such that θ(δx) > θ(σ (t)), which means that θ(σ (t)) should move up and even-
tually reaches (a neighborhood of) θn+1. Also, once θ(σ (t)) goes above θn+1, it cannot be
lower than θn+1 in any later period. Formally, we have the following result:
Lemma 4. Suppose that the interval (θn,θn+1) satisfies property (i) stated in Lemma 3. Then
for any ε > 0, there is T > 0 such that given any initial value σ (0) with θ(σ (0)) > θn and
given any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0) to the differential inclusion, we have θ(σ (t))> θn+1− ε for all
t ≥ T .
Proof. Let X∗ = ∪θ∈(θn,θn+1)F(δθ ). We first consider the special case in which θ(δx)≥ θn+1
for all x ∈ X∗. Then we will explain how to extend the proof for a general case.
Case 1: θ(δx)≥ θn+1 for all x ∈ X∗. LetX be the set of all mixed strategies σ such that
θ(σ)≥ θn+1. From Proposition 5(ii), this set is convex. Similarly, the set4X \X is convex.
So there is a hyperplane H which separates these two sets; i.e., there is a vector λ ∈ R|X | and
k ∈ R such that λ ·σ ≥ k for all σ such that θ(σ) ≥ θn+1, and λ ·σ < k for all σ such that
θ(σ) < θn+1. From Proposition 5(ii), for any σ ∈ 4X∗, we have θ(σ) ≥ θn+1 and hence
λ ·σ ≥ k.
Pick an arbitrary solution σ to the differential inclusion. Pick any time t such that θ(σ (t))∈
(θn,θn+1). Then we have
σ˙ (t) = σ −σ (t) (29)
for some σ ∈4X∗, and also we have
λ · σ˙ (t) = λ · (σ −σ (t))≥ k−λ ·σ (t)> 0. (30)
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The first equation (29), together with Proposition 5(ii), implies that θ(σ (t)) weakly increases
as time goes for all these t. That is, if θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θn,θn+1) in the current time t, then we have
θ(σ (t+η))≥ θ(σ (t)) at the next instant t+η . The second equation (30) implies that λ · σ˙ (t)
strictly increases as time goes. So σ (t)moves toward the hyperplane H if θ(σ (t))∈ (θn,θn+1)
in the current time t.
These observations immediately imply the result we want. Pick an arbitrary ε > 0, and let
ε˜ > 0 be such that θ(σ)> θn+1−ε for all σ such that λ ·σ > k− ε˜ . Pick T large enough that
ε˜T > k−λ ·σ (31)
for all σ . From (30), if λ ·σ (t) > k− ε˜ in the current period t, we have λ · σ˙ (t) ≥ ε˜ that
is, λ ·σ (t) increases at a rate at least ε˜ . Then from (31), given any initial value σ (0) with
θ(σ (0)) > θn, there is t < T such that λ ·σ (t) > k− ε˜ , which implies θ(σ (t)) > θn+1− ε .
Also (29) implies that after this time t, θ(σ (t˜)) cannot fall below θn+1− ε , that is, θ(σ (t˜))>
θn+1− ε for all t˜ > t. This implies the result, because t < T .
Case 2: θ(δx) < θn+1 for some x ∈ X∗. Let X∗∗ = {x1,x2, · · · ,xM} denote the set of
all x ∈ X∗ such that θ(δx) < θn+1. For each action xm, let ξm denote the maximal value of
θ ∈ (θn,θn+1) such that xm ∈ F(δθ ). Note that the maximum exists, because F is upper
hemi-continuous. Also, by the assumption, we have ξm < θ(δxm). Without loss of generality,
assume that θn < ξ1 ≤ ξ2 · · · ≤ ξM < θn+1.
Then we can show that there is T1 such that given any initial value σ (0) with θ(σ (0)) ∈
(θ1,ξ1] and given any solution σ to the differential inclusion, we have θ(σ (t))> ξ1 for some
time t < T1. The proof is very similar to the argument in the previous case: Let λ1 and k1 be
such that λ1 ·σ ≥ k1 for all θ(σ)≥ θ(δx1) and λ1 ·σ < k1 for all θ(σ)< θ(δx1). Then for any
t such that θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θn,ξ1], we have σ˙ (t) = σ −σ (t) for some σ ∈4X∗, and also
λ1 · σ˙ (t) = λ1 · (σ −σ (t))> k1−λ1 ·σ (t)> 0.
Note that k1−λ1 ·σ (t) is bounded away from zero uniformly in σ (t) with θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θn,ξ1],
because property (i) in Lemma 3 ensures θ(δxm) > ξm for each m. This immediately implies
the existence of T1.
Similarly, there is T2 such that given any initial value σ (0) with θ(σ (0)) ∈ (ξ1,ξ2] and
given any solution σ to the differential inclusion, we have θ(σ (t))> ξ2 for some time t < T2.
Again the proof is very similar to the argument in Case 1; the only difference is that here we
use the fact that the action x1 is never chosen when θ(σ (t)) ∈ (ξ1,ξ2].
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We iterate this process and define T1, T2, · · · , TM. Also, pick an arbitrarily small ε > 0,
and let TM+1 be such that given any initial value σ (0) with θ(σ (0)) ∈ (ξM,θn+1) and given
any solution σ to the differential inclusion, we have θ(σ (t)) > θn+1− ε for some time t <
TM+1. Then let T = T1+ · · ·+TM+1. This (ε,T ) obviously satisfies the property stated in the
lemma.
The next lemma relates the result in the previous lemma to the motion of θ(w(t)), where
w(t) is the actual frequency. It shows that if θ(w(t)) visits the interval (θn,θn+1) infinitely
often, then after a long time, θ(w(t)) cannot be less than θn+1. That is, θ(w(t)) cannot move
against the solution to the differential inclusion in the long run.
Lemma 5. Consider an interval (θn,θn+1) which satisfies property (i) in Lemma 3. Pick a
sample path h such that the property stated in Theorem 3 is satisfied and such that θ(w(t))
exceeds θn infinitely often, i.e., for any T > 0, there is t > T such that θ(w(t)) > θn. Then
liminft→∞θ(w(t))≥ θn+1.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 2(ii). Pick (θn,θn+1) and h as stated.
Pick an arbitrarily small η > 0. Then pick ε > 0 such that θ(σ) > θn+1−η for all σ such
that ‖σ − σ˜‖< ε for some σ˜ with θ(σ˜)> θn+1− η2 .
From Lemma 4, there is T > 0 such that given any initial value σ (0) with θ(σ (0)) > θn
and given any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0) to the differential inclusion,
θ(σ (t))> θn+1− η2 (32)
for all t ≥ T . Pick such T . Also, pick T˜ large enough that (22) holds for any t > T˜ and for any
s ∈ [0,2T ].
By the assumption, there is t > T˜ such that θ(w(t)) > θn. Pick such t. Then from (22),
(32), and the definition of ε , we have θ(w(t + s)) > θn+1−η for all s ∈ [T,2T ]. Applying
the same argument again, we obtain θ(w(t + s))> θn+1−η for all s≥ T , which implies that
liminft→∞θ(w(t))≥ θn+1−η . Since η can be arbitrarily small, we obtain the result.
Now we will show that θ(σt) converges almost surely. Suppose not, so that we have
liminft→∞θ(σt)< limsupt→∞θ(σt) with positive probability. Then there is a path h such that
the property stated in Theorem 3 is satisfied and such that liminft→∞θ(σt)< limsupt→∞θ(σt).
Pick such h.
Let (θn,θn+1) be an interval such that the intersection of the interval and [liminft→∞θ(σt),
limsupt→∞θ(σt)] is non-empty. Assume for now that this interval satisfies property (i) stated
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in lemma 3. By the definition of h, θ(w(t)) must exceed θn infinitely often, so Lemma 5
implies liminft→∞θ(w(t)) ≥ θn+1. But this is a contradiction, because it implies that the
intersection of (θn,θn+1) and [liminft→∞θ(σt), limsupt→∞θ(σt)] is empty.
Likewise, if the interval (θn,θn+1) satisfies property (ii) in Lemma 3, there is a contradic-
tion. Hence we must have liminft→∞θ(σt) = limsupt→∞θ(σt) almost surely.
Also, Lemma 5 implies that for each interval (θn,θn+1) which satisfies property (i) in
Lemma 3, we have limt→∞θ(σt) ∈ (θn,θn+1) with zero probability. Obviously the same is
true for each interval (θn,θn+1)which satisfies property (ii). Hence limt→∞θ(σt)∈Θ∗∗ almost
surely.
So for the case in which the boundary points {0,1} are equilibrium models, we have
limt→∞θ(σt) ∈ Θ∗. If θ = 0 is not an equilibrium model, then as in Lemma 3, we can show
that θ(δx)> θ for any model θ ∈ [θ0,θ1) and for any x ∈ F(δθ ). Then as in Lemma 5, we can
show that if a sample path h satisfies the property stated in Theorem 3 and θ(w(t)) ∈ [θ0,θ1)
infinitely often, then liminft→∞θ(w(t)) ≥ θ1. This immediately implies that σt converges to
θ0 = 0 with zero probability. Similarly, if θ = 1 is not an equilibrium model, then σt converges
to this model with zero probability. Hence the result follows.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 7
It is obvious that (c) implies (b). So in this proof, we will show that (a) implies (c), and (b)
implies (a).
A.12.1 Step 1: (a) implies (c)
Pick an attracting model θ ∗, and let A = {σ ∈ 4F(δθ∗)|θ(σ) = θ ∗}. This set is non-empty,
because F is upper hemi-continuous in σ and θ(σ) is continuous. We will show that this set
A is robustly attracting.
The following notation is useful. Let X1 be the set of all mixed strategies σ such that
θ(σ) < θ ∗. From Proposition 5, this set is convex. Similarly, the set 4X \X1 is convex.
So there is a hyperplane H1 which separates these two sets; i.e., there is a vector λ1 ∈ R|X |
and k1 such that λ1 ·σ < k1 for all σ such that θ(σ) < θ ∗, and λ1 ·σ ≥ k1 for all σ such
that θ(σ) ≥ θ ∗. Similarly, letting X2 be the set of all σ such that θ(σ) > θ ∗, there is a
hyperplane H2 which separatesX2 and4X \X2, i.e., there is a vector λ2 ∈ R|X | and k2 such
that λ2 ·σ < k2 for all σ such that θ(σ)> θ ∗, and λ2 ·σ ≥ k2 for all σ such that θ(σ)≤ θ ∗.
(These hyperplanes H1 and H2 may or may not coincide.) LetX ∗ be the set of all σ such that
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θ(σ) = θ ∗.
We first consider the special case in which F(δθ∗) = X , i.e., the agent is indifferent over
all actions in the model θ ∗. In this case, A =X ∗, i.e., the set A is the set of all mixed actions
σ with θ(σ) = θ ∗. Later on, we will explain how to extend the proof technique to the case
with F(δθ∗)⊂ X .
Case 1: F(δθ∗) = X .
Pick ε > 0 as in the definition of attracting models. Then letXε be the set of all σ such that
|θ(σ)−θ ∗|< ε . We show that this setXε is (a subset of) the basin of attraction. That is,
given any initial value σ (0) ∈Xε , any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0) to the differential inclusion will
enter a neighborhood of the set A =X ∗ in finite time and stay there forever.
So pick any initial value σ (0) ∈Xε and any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0). We first show that this
solution σ never leaves the setXε .
Lemma 6. σ (t) ∈Xε for all t, that is, |σ (t)−θ ∗|< ε for all t.
Proof. Suppose that θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗) for some t. Then we have σ˙ (t) = σ −σ (t) for
some σ ∈ 4F(δθ(σ (t))). By the definition of ε , we must have θ(σ) ≥ θ ∗; then from Propo-
sition 5, at the next instant t +η , we have θ(σ (t +η)) ≥ θ(σ (t)), i.e., θ(σ (t)) is weakly
increasing in t if σ (t) ∈ [θ ∗− ε,θ ∗). Similarly, if θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε), then θ(σ (t)) is
weakly decreasing in t. This implies the result we want.
Next, we show that A is attracting. It suffices to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 7. For any ε > 0, there is T > 0 such that for any initial value σ (0) ∈Xε and any
solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0), we have d(σ (t),X ∗)< ε for all t > T .
Proof. Suppose that θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗) for some t. Then as shown in the proof of the
previous lemma, we have σ˙ (t) = σ −σ (t) for some σ such that θ(σ) ≥ θ ∗. This in turn
implies that
λ1 · σ˙ (t) = λ1 · (σ −σ (t))≥ k1−λ1 ·σ (t)> 0.
Here the weak inequality follows from θ(σ) ≥ θ ∗, and the strict inequality follows from
θ(σ)< θ ∗. Note that k1−λ1 ·σ (t) measures the current distance from σ (t) to the hyperplane
H1, and λ1 · σ˙ (t) measures how much σ (t) gets closer to the hyperplane H1 at the next instant,
So the equation above implies that σ (t) gets closer to H1 as time goes, and the speed of
convergence is bounded away from zero until σ (t) enters a neighborhood of H1.
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Similarly, if θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε) for some t, then σ (t) gets closer to the hyperplane
H2 as time goes, and the speed of convergence is bounded away from zero until σ (t) enters
a neighborhood of H2. This implies the result we want, because the set A =X ∗ is the space
sandwiched by H1 and H2 (formally, A =4X \ (X1)∪X2)).
As a last step, we show that the set A is robustly attracting:
Lemma 8. The set A is robustly attracting.
Proof. Let H ′1 be the set of all σ with θ(σ) = θ
∗− ε2 , and H ′2 be the set of all σ with θ(σ) =
θ ∗+ ε2 . Take a small ε
∗ > 0 such that θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗)for all σ with d(σ ,H ′1) < ε∗, and
such that θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε)for all σ with d(σ ,H ′2) < ε∗. Note that such ε∗ exists because
H ′1, H
′
2,X
∗, {σ |θ(σ) = θ ∗− ε}, and {σ |θ(σ) = θ ∗+ ε} are all compact and disjoint.
Consider any solution to the ε∗-perturbed differential inclusion, and suppose that σ (t) ∈
H ′1 for some t, i.e., suppose that θ(σ (t)) = θ
∗− ε2 . Then by the definition of ε∗, σ˙ (t) =
σ −σ (t) for some σ such that θ(σ) ≥ θ ∗, which implies that θ(σ (t)) moves up at the next
instant. Likewise, if θ(σ (t)) = θ ∗+ ε2 for some t, then θ(σ (t)) moves down at the next
instant. Accordingly, if the initial value is in the set {σ |θ ∗− ε2 ≤ θ(σ)≤ ε2}, any solution to
the ε∗-perturbed differential inclusion cannot leave this set. This implies the result.
Case 2: F(δθ∗)⊂ X .
Pick small ε > 0 as stated in the the definition of attracting models. Without loss of
generality, we assume that F(δθ˜ )⊆ F(δθ∗) for all θ such that |θ −θ ∗|< ε . (Take ε small, if
necessary.)
Let Xε be as in the previous case. We show that this set Xε is (a subset of) the basin of
attraction. That is, given any initial value σ (0)∈Xε , any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0) to the differential
inclusion will enter a neighborhood of the set A in finite time and stay there forever. Note that
now the set A is a strict subset ofX ∗.
Pick any initial value σ (0) ∈Xε and any solution σ ∈ S∞σ (0). Then Lemma 6 still holds,
that is, σ (t) never leaves the setXε . Also Lemma 7 still holds, that is, σ (t) moves toward to
the setX ∗ as time goes.
Also, by the definition of ε , we have F(4Θ(σ))⊆ F(δθ∗) for any σ ∈Xε . This implies
that at every time t, we have σ˙ (t)[x] = −σ (t)[x] for each x /∈ F(δθ∗). This implies that σ (t)
assigns probability zero on any action x /∈ F(δθ∗) in the limit as t → ∞, and in particular, for
any ε > 0, there is T such that σ˙ (t)[x] = −σ (t)[x] for all x /∈ F(δθ∗) and t > T . This and
Lemma 7 imply that the set A is an attractor.
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Also, we can show that the set A is robustly attracting; the proof is very similar to that of
Lemma 8, and hence omitted.
A.12.2 Step 2: (b) implies (a)
Pick an arbitrary θ ∗, and let A = {σ ∈ 4F(δθ∗)|θ(σ) = θ ∗}. Suppose that A is an attractor.
We will show that the model θ ∗ is attracting.
Let UA be the basin of the set A, and let σ (0) be such that θ(σ (0)) < θ ∗. Then we have
the following lemma:
Lemma 9. For any θ ∈ (θ(σ (0)),θ ∗) and for any σ ∈ F(δθ ), we have θ(σ)> θ .
Proof. Suppose not, so that there is θ ∈ (θ(σ (0),θ ∗) and σ ∈ F(δθ ) such that θ(σ) ≤ θ .
Consider a solution to the differential inclusion σ ∈ S∞σ (0) such that for any time t such that
θ(σ (t)) = θ , we have σ˙ (t) = σ − σ (t). Then σ (t) ≤ θ for all t; by the definition of σ ,
θ(σ (t)) must go down whenever it hits θ(σ (t)) = θ . This contradicts with the fact that σ (0)
is in the basin of attraction.
Since F(δθ ) is upper hemi-continuous in θ , there is ε > 0 such that F(δθ ) = F(δθ˜ ) for all
θ , θ˜ ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗). Then the lemma above implies that for any θ ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗) and for any
σ ∈ F(δθ ), we have θ(σ)≥ θ ∗.
Similarly, we can show that there is ε˜ > 0 such that for any θ ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε˜) and for any
σ ∈ F(δθ ), we have θ(σ)≤ θ ∗. Hence θ ∗ is attracting.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 8
Only if: Suppose that a model θ ∗ ∈ (0,1) is repelling. Then upper hemi-continuity of F
implies that there are pure actions x and x˜ such that θ(δx)< θ ∗ < θ(δx˜) and and x, x˜ ∈ F(δθ∗).
Then from Proposition 5, there is a mixture σ∗ of these actions x and x˜ such that θ(σ∗) = θ ∗.
Obviously this σ∗ is a mixed equilibrium with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗. So it suffices to show that all
mixed equilibria with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗ are repelling.
Choose ε > 0 as stated in the definition of repelling models. Then as in the proof of
Proposition 7 there is a hyperplane which separates mixed actions σ with θ(σ)≥ θ ∗+ε from
others. That is, there is λ1 ∈R|X | and k1 ∈R such that λ1 ·σ ≥ k1 if and only if θ(σ)≥ θ ∗+ε .
Likewise, there is λ2 and k2 such that λ2 ·σ ≥ k2 if and only if θ(σ)≤ θ ∗− ε .
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Let U be the set of all σ such that θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗− ε2 ,θ ∗+ ε2). Also, choose T sufficiently
large so that
(k1−λ1 ·σ)T > k1−λ1 · σ˜ (33)
for all σ with θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε2) and for all σ˜ with θ(σ˜) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε2), and that
(k2−λ2 ·σ)T > k2−λ2 · σ˜ (34)
for all σ with θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗− ε2 ,θ ∗) and for all σ˜ with θ(σ˜) ∈ (θ ∗− ε2 ,θ ∗).
We will show that these U and T satisfy the property stated in the definition of repelling
equilibria. This completes the proof, because any mixed equilibrium σ∗ with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗ is
in the interior of U .
The following result is useful:
Claim 9. For any initial point σ ∈ U with θ(σ) 6= θ ∗ and for any solution σ ∈ S∞σ to the
differential inclusion, there is t < T such that σ (t) /∈U .
Proof. First, consider the case in which θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε2). Pick an arbitrary path σ ∈ S∞σ .
Suppose that θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε2) in some period t. Then since θ ∗ is repelling, σ˙ (t) =
σ −σ (t) for some σ such that θ(σ)≥ θ ∗+ ε . Hence
λ1 · σ˙ (t) = λ1 · (σ −σ (t))≥ k1−λ1 ·σ (t)> 0
where the weak inequality follows from θ(σ)≥ θ ∗+ε , and the strict inequality follows from
θ(σ (t)) < θ ∗+ ε2 . This implies that λ1 · σ˙ (t) increases whenever θ(σ (t)) ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε2) in
the current period t. Hence there is t < T such that λ1 ·θ(σ (t))≥ θ ∗+ ε2 , implying σ (t) /∈U .
A similar argument applies to the case in which θ(σ) ∈ (θ ∗− ε2 ,θ ∗).
Now we will show that U and T satisfy the property stated in the definition of repelling
equilibria. Pick an arbitrary σ ∈U . There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: θ(σ) 6= θ ∗. Pick any action x. For β close to one, a perturbed mixture βσ +
(1−β )δx is still in the set U , and θ(βσ +(1−β )δx) 6= θ ∗. Hence from the claim above,
starting from this perturbed mixture βσ +(1−β )δx, any solution to the differential inclusion
must leave the set U within time T . So this σ satisfies the property stated in the definition of
repelling equilibria.
Case 2: θ(σ) = θ ∗. Pick an arbitrary pure action x ∈ F(δθ∗). Since θ ∗ is repelling,
θ(δx) 6= θ ∗. So from Proposition 5(iii), for any β sufficiently close to one, θ(βσ + (1−
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β )δx)∈ (θ ∗− ε2 ,θ ∗)∪(θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε2). Hence, from the above claim, starting from this perturbed
mixture βσ+(1−β )δx, any solution to the differential inclusion must leave the setU within
time T . So this σ satisfies the property stated in the definition of repelling equilibria.
If: Let θ ∗ ∈ (0,1) be such that θ(δx) 6= θ ∗ for each pure action x∈ F(δθ∗), there is at least
one mixed equilibrium σ∗ with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗, and all such mixed equilibria are repelling. We
will show that the model θ ∗ is repelling.
Pick an arbitrary repelling equilibrium σ∗ with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗, and let T and U be as in the
definition of repelling equilibria. Then each point σ ∈ U satisfies property (i) or (ii) in the
definition of repelling equilibria. In particular, σ = σ∗ satisfies property (ii), i.e., starting from
a perturbed action frequency βσ∗+(1−β )δx, any solution to the differential inclusion must
leave the neighborhood U of σ∗ within time T . This is so because σ∗ is an equilibrium and
never satisfies property (i).
As the following lemma shows, this property implies that θ ∗ is indeed repelling.
Lemma 10. θ ∗ is repelling.
Proof. We prove by contradiction, so suppose that θ ∗ is not repelling. Then from the upper
hemi-continuity of F , there is ε > 0 and a pure action x ∈ F(δθ∗) such that
(a) θ(δx)> θ ∗ and x ∈ F(δθ ) for all θ ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗), or
(b) θ(δx)< θ ∗ and x ∈ F(δθ ) for all θ ∈ (θ ∗,θ ∗+ ε).
Pick such ε and x. In what follows, we focus on the case in which this action x satisfies
property (a). (The proof for the other case is symmetric, and hence omitted.)
Since σ∗ is a mixed equilibrium with θ(σ∗) = θ ∗ and since there is no pure action x with
θ(δx) = θ ∗, there must be two actions x and x˜ such that x, x˜∈ F(δθ∗) and θ(δx)< θ ∗ < θ(δx˜).
Pick such x and x˜. Pick β ∈ (0,1) close to one so that θ(βσ∗+(1− β )δx) ∈ (θ ∗− ε,θ ∗).
Then consider the following path σ which starts from βσ∗+(1−β )δx:
σ˙ (t) =
{
δx∗−σ (t) if θ(σ (t))< θ ∗
σ∗−σ (t) if θ(σ (t)) = θ ∗ .
In words, on this path, the share of x∗ increases until θ(σ (t)) hits θ ∗, and after that σ (t)
moves toward the equilibrium σ∗. Clearly this path solves the differential inclusion with the
initial value βσ∗+(1−β )δx, and in particular, if β is sufficiently close to one, this path never
leaves the neighborhood U of σ∗. This implies that σ = σ∗ does not satisfy property (ii) in
the definition of repelling equilibria, which is a contradiction.
62
A.14 Proof of Proposition 9
We say a correspondence B : [0,1]→R has the staircase property if there exists a K <∞, 0=
a0 < a1 < ... < aK = 1 in [0,1] and (Ai)Ki=0 such that Ai ⊆R closed, bounded and convex such
that for each i ∈ {0, ...,K}, (i) B(ai) = Ai and for each θ ∈ (ai,ai+1), B(θ) = x¯i ≡max{x : x ∈
Ai}, (ii) x¯i = xi+1 ≡min{x : x ∈ Ai+1}.
Claim 10. The correspondence θ 7→ B(θ)≡ θ(∆F(δθ )) has the staircase property.
Proof. We first show that if the mapping θ 7→G(θ)≡ F(δθ ) is uhc and satisfies maxF(δθ )≤
minF(δθ ′) for all θ ′ > θ , then it follows that there exists a K <∞, 0= a0 < a1 < ... < aK = 1
in [0,1] and (Ai)Ki=0 such that Ai ⊆ X finite such that for each i ∈ {0, ...,K}, (i) G(ai) = Ai
and for each θ ∈ (ai,ai+1), G(θ) = x¯i ≡ max{x : x ∈ Ai}, (ii) x¯i = xi+1 ≡ min{x : x ∈ Ai+1}.
Second, we will show that B has the staircase property with K, 0 = a0 < a1 < ... < aK = 1 in
[0,1] and (Bi)Ki=0 where Bi ≡ θ(∆Ai) = [θ(δxi),θ(δxi+1)].
For the first part note that if G is constant over a non-trivial interval, it must be single
valued. If not, there exists a θ ′ > θ such maxF(δθ ) > minF(δθ ′). Moreover by the order
condition and the fact that X is finite, it follows that the set of points in [0,1] wherein G is
multi-valued is finite, we denote it as 0 = a0 < a1 < ... < aK = 1. For each i ∈ {1, ..,K}, let
Ai ≡ G(ai). As maxG(θ) ≤ minG(θ) for all θ ′ > θ , it follows that for each θ ∈ (ai,ai+1),
G(θ)≥ x¯i ≡max{x : x ∈ Ai} and x¯i ≤ xi+1 ≡min{x : x ∈ Ai+1}. By the fact that G is uhc and
X is finite, it must hold that G(θ) = x¯i, otherwise there exists a sequence a sequence (θn,x)n
converging to (ai,x) such that x = G(θn) but x > max{x : x ∈ G(ai)}. A similar argument
shows that x¯i = xi+1.
We now show the correspondence θ 7→ B(θ) ≡ θ(∆F(δθ )) has the staircase property.
Take any i ∈ {0, ...,K}, for any b ∈ (ai,ai+1), B(b) = θi ≡ θ(δx¯i) and B(ai) = θ(∆F(δai)) =
θ(∆Ai); this establishes condition (i) of the definition. We will show now that θ(∆Ai) =
[θ(δxi),θ(δx¯i+1)] which will finish the proof. By finiteness of X , Ai = {x(1), ...,x(L)} such that
x(1)< x(2)< ... < x(L) (where the indexes can depend on i), and as x 7→ θ(δx) is increasing,
θ(δx(1))< ... < θ(δx(L)).
We first show that θ(∆Ai)⊆ [θ(δxi),θ(δx¯i+1)]. For this, we first show that
θ(δxi) = θ(δx(1)) = min{θ : θ ∈ θ(∆Ai)} .
We do this iteratively. If L = 2, then ∆Ai = {σλ (x(1),x(2)) ≡ λ1δx(1)+ λ2δx(2) : λ ∈ ∆1}
(throughout, σλ (x(i), ..,x(m)) denotes a mixed action over actions x(i), ...,x(m) with weights
63
λ ). By Proposition 5, λ 7→ θ(σλ (x(1),x(2))) is non-decreasing, there
θ(δx(1)) = min{θ : θ ∈ θ(∆Ai)} ≤ θ(δx(2)) = max{θ : θ ∈ θ(∆Ai)}.
If L = 3, we want to show that θ(δx(1)) ≤ θ(σλ (x(1),x(2),x(3))) for any λ ∈ ∆2. If λ1 = 0,
then it suffices to show that θ(δx(1))≤ θ(σλ (x(2),x(3))) for any λ ∈ ∆1. By our calculations
for the case L = 2, it follows that θ(δx(2)) ≤ θ(σλ (x(2),x(3))) and since θ(δx(1)) ≤ θ(δx(2))
the desired result follows. If λ1 > 0, then
σλ (x(1),x(2),x(3))= λ1δx(1)+(1−λ1)
(
λ2
1−λ1δx(2)+
λ3
1−λ1δx(3)
)
= λ1δx(1)+(1−λ1)σλ ′(x(2),x(3))
for a λ ′ that is a function of λ . So, by Proposition 5, it suffices to show that θ(δx(1)) ≤
θ(σλ (x(2),x(3))) for any λ ∈ ∆1, which we already showed. Iterating in this fashion the
result can be showed for L≥ 1.
The proof that θ(δx¯i) = θ(δx(L)) = max{θ : θ ∈ θ(∆Ai)} is analogous and thus omitted.
Finally, since x¯i = xi+1, it follows that θ(δx¯i) = θ(δxi+1). Thus, we have shown that
θ(∆Ai)⊆ [θ(δxi),θ(δxi+1)] as desired.
We now show that θ(∆Ai) ⊇ [θ(δxi),θ(δxi+1)]. Suppose not, that is, there exists a θ ∈
[θ(δxi),θ(δxi+1)]\θ(∆Ai). There exists a l ∈ {1, ...,L} such that θ(δx(l))≤ θ ≤ θ(δx(l+1)). By
Lemma 1, λ 7→ θ(σλ (x(l),x(l+1)) is continuous. By Bolzano, there exists a λ ∗ such that θ =
θ(σλ ∗(x(l),x(l+1)). But σλ ∗(x(l),x(l+1))∈ ∆Ai and we thus arrived to a contradiction.
Let Θ∗ be the set of equilibrium models. It is easy to check that Θ∗ coincides with the
set of fixed points of B. Also, this set is nonempty: we can take a nondecreasing selection
from the correspondence B and, by Tarski’s fixed point theorem, it must have at least one fixed
point; since it is a selection of B, then B must have at least one fixed point. Moreover, as B
has the staircase property, the set of fixed points Θ∗ is finite and its elements can only be in
the following form:
1. An end-point of a vertical segment of B.
2. An interior point of a vertical segment of B.
3. A point in the interior of a horizontal segment of B.
4. θ = 0 when there exists a a > 0 such that B(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0,a], or θ = 1 when
there exists a a > 0 such that B(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ [1−a,1].
By Proposition 6, (θ(σt))t converges almost surely to one element in Θ∗. We now show
that it has to converge to an element characterized by cases 3 or 4.
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Case 1 is ruled out because at an end-point of a vertical segment θ ′, F(δθ ′) contains more
than one action, and so the corresponding pure action equilibrium is not strict, a situation that
was ruled out by assumption.
An equilibrium model characterized by case 2 is repelling by Definition 7. By Proposition
8, the mixed action associated to this equilibrium model is repelling. Thus, by Proposition 3,
the action frequency converges to such equilibrium model with probability zero. Therefore,
convergence occurs to an equilibrium model characterized in case 3 or 4.
Equilibrium models characterized in cases 3 and 4 are attracting by Definition 2 and are
supported by a pure action. To conclude, let θ ∗ be the point to which the sequence (θ(σt))t
converges to, and denote the associated pure strategy by x∗. The fact that θ(.) is increasing
implies that (σt)t converges to x∗. Finally, we observe that using Theorem 1 it can be shown
that (σt)t converging to x∗ implies that the beliefs (µt)t converges to δθ∗ where θ ∗ = θ(δx∗).
As F(δθ∗) is a pure action, upper hemi-continuity of F implies that (F(µt))t also converges
to x∗.
A.15 Proof of Proposition 10
∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)Fβ (µ)⊆∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)F0(µ): Let σ ∈∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)Fβ (µ). Fix any x such that σ(x)>
0. Since σ ∈ ∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ) Fβ (µ), there exists µx ∈ ∆Θ(σ) such that x ∈ Fβ (µx). It suffices to
show that x ∈ F0(µx). Since x ∈ Fβ (µx), for any x′ ∈ X ,
ˆ
(pi(x,y)+βV (B(x,y,µx))Q¯µx(dy | x) =
ˆ
(pi(x,y)Q¯µx(dy | x)+βV (µx)
≥
ˆ (
pi(x′,y)+βV (B(x′,y,µx))
)
Q¯µx(dy | x′)
≥
ˆ
(pi(x′,y)Q¯µx(dy | x′)+βV (µx),
where the first line follows from weak identification (which implies B(x,y,µx) = µx for all y in
the support of Q¯µx(· | x)), the second line follows from x ∈ Fβ (µx), and the third line follows
from the convexity of the value function and the martingale property of Bayesian updating
(which imply, using Jensen’s inequality,
´
V (B(x′,y,µx))Q¯µx(dy | x′)≥V (
´
B(x′,y,µx)Q¯µx(dy |
x′)) =V (µx)). Therefore, x is myopically the best action, i.e., x ∈ F0(µx).
∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)F0(µ)=∪µ∈∆Θ(σ)∆F0(µ): The direction⊇ holds trivially, so we only establish
⊆. Let σ ∈ ∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ) F0(µ). Fix any x,x′ such that σ(x)> 0. Since σ ∈ ∆∪µ∈∆Θ(σ) Fβ (µ),
there exist µx,µx′ ∈ ∆Θ(σ) such that x ∈ F0(µx) and x′ ∈ F0(µx′). By weak identification and
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the fact that µx and µx′ both belong to ∆Θ(σ), Q¯µx(· | x˜) = Q¯µx′ (· | x˜) for all x˜ in the support
of σ . Therefore, for any x′′ ∈ X ,
ˆ
pi(x′,y)Q¯µx(dy|x′) =
ˆ
pi(x,y′)Q¯µx(dy|x)≥
ˆ
pi(x′′,y)Q¯µx(dy|x′′),
and so x′ ∈ F0(µx). Since x′ is an arbitrary element in the support of σ , we have shown that
there is a common belief µx under which any action in the support of σ is optimal.
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